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1. Cultural	 Heritage:	 Multiple	 Actors,	 Multilevel	 Actions,	 but	 One	 “Ultimate	
Authority”		Cultural	 heritage	 law	 is	 a	 versatile,	 multifaceted	 topic.	 From	 a	 European	 private	 and	comparative	 law	 perspective	 it	 is	 a	 rather	 complex	 field	 too.	 Even	 a	 casual	 observer	 soon	realizes	that	in	recent	decades	a	growing	number	of	international	treaties	and	European	legal	acts	frame	the	law	and	policy	on	the	protection	of	cultural	heritage	at	the	transnational	level.	The	European	Union	(EU)	in	particular	is	a	kind	of	laboratory	in	this	respect.	Across	Europe	several	 layers	 of	 sources	 (national/international;	 formal/informal;	 legislative/judicial;	public/private)	 overlap,	 contributing	 to	 the	 development	 of	 eclectic	 solutions	 and	 the	generation	of	normative	tensions	as	well.		This	complexity	is	evident	in	the	rules	governing	the	circulation	of	cultural	goods.	The	EU	does	not	have	an	all-encompassing	competence	to	legislate	on	this	matter,	which	therefore	still	involves	general	private	law	issues	under	the	laws	of	the	Member	States.	In	those	areas	of	the	 law	 in	 which	 the	 EU	 is	 competent,	 the	 directives	 adopted	 by	 the	 Union	 have	 to	 be	transposed	into	national	legal	systems,	with	the	effect	that	some	or	many	aspects	of	domestic	private	 law	will	 have	 an	 EU	basis,	 or	will	 be	 affected	 by	 EU	 law.	 Even	when	 the	 European	measures	 are	 not	 implemented,	 national	 jurisdictions	 and	 their	 private	 law	 regimes	 are	inevitably	 put	 under	 pressure	 by	 EU	 law,	 thus	 they	 evolve	 in	 the	 light	 of	 it	 and	 are	 thus	“fertilized”	by	it.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	Member	States	maintain	their	sovereignty	with	
	2	
 
respect	 to	 their	 national	 treasures.	 Against	 this	 background,	 the	 Chapter	 contributes	 to	 the	general	debate	on	the	perennial	tension	between	the	EU	and	the	Member	States	by	addressing	some	of	the	questions	concerning	the	circulation	of	cultural	goods	within	the	internal	market.	The	tension	between	the	centre	and	the	periphery,	typical	of	a	sui	generis	supranational	actor	such	as	 the	European	Union,	 is	 complicated	by	 the	participation	of	 the	EU	and	 the	Member	States	 to	 the	 international	 community:	 their	 policies	 and	 their	 national	 legislation	 cannot	disregard	 the	 global	 framework.	 This	 Chapter	 then	 provides	 a	 short	 sketch	 of	 the	development	and	the	key	features	of	the	global	framework,	to	better	understand	the	EU	legal	landscape	 and	 that	 of	 its	Member	 States.	 Going	 through	 fundamental	UNESCO	 conventions,	UNSC	 resolutions,	 the	UNIDROIT	 and	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe’s	 legal	 instruments,	 to	 the	 self-regulation	of	national	and	international	associations	of	museums	such	as	AAM,	AAMD,	ICOM	and	confederation	of	 art	 and	antique	dealer	associations	 (such	as	 the	CINOA	Confédération	internationale	des	Négociants	d’oeuvres	d’art),	the	Chapter	tackles	the	response	of	the	EU	to	current	global	challenges	like	terrorism,	and	present	the	EU	as	global	actor	and	trendsetter	in	the	area	 covered	 by	our	analysis.	The	 legal	 framework	of	 trade	 in	 cultural	property	 is	 then	examined	by	 considering	 the	 language	questions	and	 the	 terminological	 issues	arising	 from	the	 reference	 to	 the	notion	of	 “national	 treasure”	 in	 relation	 to	 those	of	 “cultural	property”	and	“cultural	heritage”,	which	are	recurrent	in	key	international	and	European	law	provisions.	The	 Chapter	 also	 discusses	 the	 relationship	 between	 “national	 treasures”	 and	 the	 broad	notion	of	“culture”,	by	addressing	the	“cultural	exception”	to	free	trade	(WTO	and	TFEU),	the	notion	 of	 “national	 treasure”	 in	 the	 Directive	 2014/60	 and	 in	 some	 Member	 States’	implementation	measures,	 to	highlight	 the	problematic	 legacy	of	 the	 repealed	Annex	of	 the	Directive	93/7.	The	Chapter	finally	casts	light	on	the	Member	States	great	freedom	to	define	their	“national	 treasures”,	which	 is	 in	 tension	with	other	aspects	of	EU	policy	 in	 the	 field	of	cultural	heritage.	We	further	make	the	point	that,	with	respect	to	cultural	property,	any	legal	regime	 based	 on	 the	 stereotypical	 classic	 individual,	 absolute,	 and	 exclusive	 ownership	 is	bound	to	be	inadequate.	In	our	view,	therefore,	even	when	in	private	hands,	cultural	property	provides	an	example	of	 “another	way	of	owning”,	bound	up,	 as	 it	 is,	with	 social	obligations	concerning	its	fruition.			
2. Early	Goals	
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	With	the	aim	of	harmonizing	the	global	legal	(dis)order,	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Second	World	War	 two	 main	 actors,	 first	 UNESCO	 and	 later	 on	 UNIDROIT,	 proposed	 the	 adoption	 of	international	 instruments	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 cultural	 heritage.1	 Since	 the	 1950s	 the	international	 community	 has	 shown	 an	 increasingly	 shared	 political	 commitment	 toward	targeting	 the	 illicit	 trade	 in	 cultural	 objects,	 both	 in	 times	 of	 peace	 and	 in	 wartime	 (1954	HAGUE	Convention)2.	Artworks,	archaeological	objects,	antiquities,	curiosities,	specimens	and	collections,	or	high-value	Indigenous	objects	that	combine	elements	of	sacredness	and	beauty	all	 come	 into	 consideration	 in	 this	 respect3.	 The	 main	 goal	 has	 been	 to	 combat	 the	 illicit	trafficking	 in	 cultural	 objects,	 regulating	 States’	 actions	 to	 claim	 the	 return	 of	 such	 objects	(1970	 UNESCO	 Convention).4	 For	 some	 States	 the	 general	 rules	 on	 the	 acquisition	 of	ownership	 a	 non	 domino	 (“possession	 vaut	 titre”)	 impedes	 the	 efficiency	 of	 return	mechanisms.	This	is	the	case	in	most	civil	law	countries	worldwide,	while	in	principle	the	true	owner	prevails	over	all	other	purchasers	in	common	law	jurisdictions.5	These	inconsistences	have	 been	 exploited	 by	 fraudsters	 and	 criminals	 involved	 in	 “artwork	 laundering”6.	 The	
                                                             1	 General	 references	 in	 Craig	 Forrest,	 International	 Law	 and	 the	 Protection	 of	 Cultural	 Heritage,	 Routledge,	London	 –	 New	 York	 2010;	 Toshiyuki	 Kono,	 Stefan	Wrbca,	 The	 Impact	 of	 Uniform	 Laws	 on	 the	 Protection	 of	
Cultural	Heritage	and	 the	Preservation	of	Cultural	Heritage	 in	 the	21st	Century,	 in	 J.	Sánchez	Cordero	 (ed.),	The	
Impact	of	Uniform	Law	on	National	Law.	Limits	and	Possibilities,	México	D.F.:	 Inst.	de	 Investigaciones	 Jurídicas	2010,	p.	453	 ff.;	 James	A.R.	Nafziger,	Robert	K.	Paterson	 (eds.),	Handbook	on	 the	Law	of	Cultural	Heritage	and	
International	Trade,	Chelthenham	UK	–	Northampton	MA	USA:	Edward	Elgar,	2014;	 Janet	Blake,	 International	
Cultural	Heritage	Law,	London	–	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press	2015;	Manlio	Frigo,	La	Circulation	des	biens	
culturels,	Leiden:	Martinus	Nijhoff,	2016;	Francesco		Francioni,	Cultural	property	in	International	Law,	in	Michele		Graziadei,	Lionel	Smith	 (eds.),	Comparative	property	 law:	Global	Perspectives,	 ,	Cheltenham	UK	–	Northampton	MA	USA:	Edward	Elgar,,	2017,		374	ff.	2	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Cultural	Property	in	the	Event	of	Armed	Conflict,	14	May	1954,	249	UNTS	240.	3	Margaret	Bruchac,	Art	or	Patrimony?	Indigenous	Objects	in	the	International	Art	Market.	Anthropology	News	54	(2013):	7-8.	http://repository.upenn.edu/anthro_papers/119.	4	 UNESCO	 Convention	 on	 the	Means	 of	 Prohibiting	 and	 Preventing	 the	 Illicit	 Import,	 Export	 and	 Transfer	 of	Ownership	of	Cultural	Property,	14	November	1970,	823	UNTS	231.	5	Italian	law,	for	example,	protects	an	acquisition	made	in	good	faith	from	a	person	who	is	not	the	owner,	even	if	the	goods	are	stolen	or	involuntarily	lost	(Article	1153	of	the	Italian	Civil	Code).	Good	faith	is	presumed	(Article	1147	c.	 c.).	France	 (Article	2276,	ex	2279	of	 the	French	Civil	Code)	and	Germany	(para.	935	BGB),	protect	an	acquisition	made	in	good	faith	only	if	the	goods	are	not	stolen	or	involuntarily	lost.		Cf	 Francesca	 Fiorentini,	 Kristin	 Hausler,	 Alicja	 Jagielska-Burduk	 &	 Andrzej	 Jakubowski,	 Editorial,	 “Editorial”,	
Santander	 Art	 and	 Culture	 Law	 Review	 2,	 no.	 2	 (2016):	 9-20,	 at	 15.	 Alessandro	 Chechi,	 The	 Settlement	 of	
International	Cultural	Heritage	Disputes,	London	–	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014,	90	ff	(and	the	entire	chapter	for	a	thorough	treatment	of	related	problems).		6	Fiorentini,	Hausler,	Jagielska-Burduk	&.	Jakubowski,	Editorial,	cit	nt.	5	at	16.	In	the	famous	case	of	Winkworth	v.	
Christie	Manson	&	Woods	Ltd	[1980]	Ch.	496,	[1980]	1	All	E.R.	1121,	cultural	goods	stolen	in	England	had	been	brought	to	Italy	and	were	acquired	there	under	Article	1153	of	the	Italian	Civil	Code	by	an	art	collector	who	was	unaware	of	the	fact	that	they	had	been	stolen.	They	were	then	moved	back	to	England	and	sold	on	auction.	The	
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improvement	 of	 the	 return	 mechanisms	 for	 stolen	 and	 illegally	 exported	 cultural	 objects,	through	a	uniform	law	approach	impacting	on	national	substantive	laws	concerning	the	good	faith	 acquisition	 of	 cultural	 objects,	 was	 thus	 promoted	 by	 Unidroit	 (1995	 UNIDROIT	Convention).7		The	drafting	of	 these	Conventions	was	an	opportunity	 to	highlight	 the	 importance	of	protecting	cultural	heritage	as	a	model	of	public	education,	instilling	a	sense	of	responsibility	in	both	the	public	and	private	sectors.	 Indirectly,	 these	treaties	 forged	a	vocabulary	as	well,	which	 helped	 to	 frame	 several	 other	 instruments.	 Unilateral	 repatriation	 has	 thus	 become	more	 common	 following	 these	 international	 interventions.	 For	 example,	 the	 Denver	 Art	Museum	not	only	returned	some	40	wooden	totems,	known	as	vigangos,	to	Uganda	recently,	but	also	paid	for	their	return.8	Unfortunately,	many	of	the	States	parties	to	the	1970	UNESCO	Convention	have	either	limited	or	 cherry-picked	 their	obligations9.	The	national	models	 for	 implementing	 the	1970	UNESCO	Convention	 are	 remarkably	 diverse,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 black	 letter	 law	 and	 in	practice.10	Furthermore,	the	number	of	trained	officials	to	supervise	controls	over	the	export	of	 cultural	 objects	 is	 inadequate	 and	 varies	 from	 State	 to	 State,11	 despite	 agreed-upon	mechanisms	to	 increase	controls	on	a	reciprocal	basis.	The	1995	UNIDROIT	Convention	has	been	subjected	to	criticism	as	well,	because	it	requires	the	buyer	to	verify	the	provenance	of	the	 cultural	object	 in	order	 to	be	able	 to	obtain	 compensation,	when	compelled	 to	return	a	stolen	 object.	 It	 has	 become	 necessary	 to	 explain	 the	 “due	 diligence	 in	 contrahendo”	requirement	both	to	possessors,	to	enable	them	to	know	what	to	do,	and	to	national	judges,	to	enable	 them	 to	 assess	 the	 possessor’s	 conduct,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 legal	
                                                                                                                                                                                                          original	 owner	 claimed	ownership,	 but	 the	 Court	 rejected	 the	 claim,	 stating	 that	 there	 had	been	 a	 good	 faith	acquisition	by	the	art	collector	according	to	the	law	of	Italy,	where	the	acquisition	took	place.	7	UNIDROIT	Convention	on	Stolen	or	Illegally	Exported	Cultural	Objects,	24	June	1995,	34	ILM	1322.	8	James	A.R.	Nafziger,	Trading	and	Returning	Cultural	Objects	under	International	Law,	Santander	Art	and	Culture	
Law	Review	2,	no.	2	(2016):	179-194,	at	189.	On	the	Italian	practice:	Tullio	Scovazzi	(ed.)	La	restituzione	dei	beni	
culturali	rimossi	con	particolare	riguardo	alla	pratica	italiana,	Milano:	Giuffrè.	2014	9	Japan,	for	example,	confines	its	Treaty	obligations	under	Article	7	to	prohibiting	the	importation	of	“specifically	designated”	 foreign	 cultural	 objects;	 the	 United	 States	 has	 been	 hostile	 to	 the	 enforcement	 of	 foreign	 export	controls,	except	in	cases	of	illegally	exported	objects	characterized	as	stolen	property.	See	James	A.R.	Nafziger,	cit	previous	note,	at	189.	10	See	Patty	Gerstenblith,	Models	of	 Implementation	of	the	1970	UNESCO	Convention:	Can	Their	Effectiveness	Be	
Determined?	 in	 Realising	 Cultural	 Heritage	 Law:	 Festschrift	 for	 Patrick	 O’Keefe,	 edited	 by	 Lyndel	 Prott,	 Ruth	Redmond-Cooper	and	Stephen	Urice,	Crickadarn:	Institute	of	Art	and	Law,	2013,	pp.	9-25,	at	9.	11	Nafziger	cit	supra	note	8,	at	190.	
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certainty.	Despite	these	reservations,	the	1995	UNIDROIT	Convention	provided	the	basis	for	new	European	rules	to	govern	the	cross-border	circulation	of	cultural	goods.12		European	 developments	 become	 significant	 in	 the	 1990s,	 with	 the	 signature	 of	 the	Treaty	on	European	Union	(Maastricht	Treaty,	soon	replaced	by	the	Amsterdam	Treaty),	the	Single	European	Market	 strategy,	 the	accession	of	new	Members	States	 to	 cover	almost	 the	whole	 of	 western	 Europe,	 the	 Schengen	 Agreement,	 and	 a	 new	 process	 of	 membership	negotiations	 with	 ten	 countries	 from	 central	 and	 eastern	 Europe.	 In	 those	 years,	 the	 EU	institutions	decided	to	establish	a	system	of	controls	over	the	export	of	cultural	objects,	aimed	at	 supplementing	 the	 protection	 afforded	 by	 heterogeneous	 national	 rules.	 Regulation	3911/9213	was	 intended	 to	 ensure	 uniform	 export	 controls	 at	 the	 EU’s	 external	 borders	 of	national	cultural	objects	exported	outside	the	Single	European	Market,	while	Directive	93/714	aimed	 at	 facilitating	 the	 return	 of	 certain	 cultural	 objects	 unlawfully	 removed	 from	 the	territory	 of	 a	 Member	 State,	 thereby	 contributing	 to	 the	 safeguarding	 of	 national	 cultural	heritage,	and	also	introduced	the	right	to	fair	compensation	for	possessors	who	purchased	in	good	faith.	Both	instruments	were	applied	to	those	cultural	objects	that	belonged	to	one	of	the	categories	 listed	 in	 an	 Annex,	 and	 both	 derived	 from	 the	 necessity	 to	 reconcile	 the	 free	movement	 of	 goods	with	 the	determination	 of	 EU	Member	 States	 to	 protect	 their	 “national	treasures”.	 National	 legislative	 regimes	 indeed	 prohibit,	 or	 at	 least	 restrict,	 the	 export	 of	cultural	 objects15,	 but	 often	 the	 States	 of	 destination	 (i.e.	 the	market	 nations)	 consider	 the	
                                                             12	 Marina	 Schneider,	 The	 1995	 UNIDROIT	 Convention:	 An	 Indispensable	 Complement	 to	 the	 1970	 UNESCO	
Convention	 and	 an	 Inspiration	 for	 the	 2014/60/EU	 Directive,	 Santander	 Art	 and	 Culture	 Law	 Review	 2,	 no.	 2	(2016):	149-164,	at	155.	13	 Council	 Regulation	 (EEC)	 No.	 3911/92	 of	 9	 December	 1992	 on	 the	 export	 of	 cultural	 goods,	 OJ	 L	 395,	31.12.1992,	p.	1.		14	Council	Directive	93/7/EEC	of	15	March	1993	on	the	return	of	cultural	objects	unlawfully	removed	from	the	territory	of	a	Member	State,	OJ	L	74,	27.03.1993,	p.	74.	The	Italian	literature	on	the	subject	 is	substantial:	see,	e.g.,:	Manlio	Frigo,	La	 circolazione	 internazionale	 dei	beni	 culturali:	 diritto	 internazionale,	 diritto	 comunitario	 e	
diritto	 interno,	 2nd	 ed.,	 Milano,	 2007;	 	 François	 Lafarge,	 Beni	 culturali,	 in	 Trattato	 di	 diritto	 amministrativo	
europeo	Parte	speciale,	tomo	II,	edited	by	Mario	P.	Chiti	and	Guido	Greco,	Milano:	Giuffrè,	2007,	pp.	671-708	 ;	Michele	 Graziadei,	 Beni	 culturali	 (circolazione	 dei)	 (diritto	 internazionale	 privato),	 in	 Enciclopedia	 del	 diritto,	
Annali,	II,	t.	2,	Milano,	2008,	pp.	91	-114;	Barbara	Pasa,	Beni	culturali	(diritto	dell’Unione	europea),	in	Digesto	delle	
discipline	 privatistiche:	 sezione	 civile,	 Aggiornamento,	Utet,	 Torino,	 2010,	 pp.	 73-101;	 Lorenzo	 Casini	 (ed.),	 La	
globalizzazione	dei	beni	culturali,	Bologna:	il	Mulino,	2010;	Geo	Magri,	La	circolazione	dei	beni	culturali	nel	diritto	
europeo:	limiti	ed	obblighi	di	restituzione,	Napoli:	ESI,	2011;	Lorenzo	Casini,	Ereditare	il	futuro.	Quattro	dilemmi	
sul	 patrimonio	 culturale,	 Bologna:	 Il	 Mulino,	 2016.	 For	 recent	 comments:	 Robert	 Peters,	 Marja	 van	 Heese,	Bernard	Łukańko,	Piotr	Stec,	Marina	Schneider,	Wojciech	W.	Kowalski,	Geo	Magri,	all	 in	the	Santander	Art	and	
Culture	Law	Review,	issue	2/2016.	15	This	is	not	a	recent	tendency:	François		Lafarge,	Cinzia	Profeti,	Les	lois	duGrand-Duché	de	Toscane	relatives	à	
l’exportation	 d’oeuvres	 d’art	 (1737-1859):	 entre	 perfectionnisme	 législatif	 et	 intérêts	 économiques	 ,	 in	 Normes	
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import	 of	 such	 objects	 as	 permissible	 under	 their	 domestic	 legislation,	 and	 refuse	 to	 apply	foreign	 legislation	 (i.e.	 that	 of	 the	 source	 nation)	 which	 prohibits,	 or	 limits,	 the	 export	 of	cultural	objects.		Cultural	nationalism	(namely,	the	identification	of	the	State	as	the	“ultimate	authority”	in	this	matter)	has	thus	determined	the	global	movement	to	ensure,	at	a	supranational	level,	compliance	with	national	protective	regimes	for	cultural	objects	between	States.		Directive	93/7	was	criticized	by	both	Member	States	and	European	institutions	for	its	narrow	 scope	 of	 application,	 the	 short	 limitation	 period	 within	 which	 return	 proceedings	could	be	initiated	(within	one	year	after	the	requesting	Member	State	authority	became	aware	of	the	location	of	the	object	and	the	identity	of	its	possessor),	and	its	lack	of	clarity	as	to	the	requirements	to	be	met	to	obtain	the	return	of	the	cultural	object.16			
3. 	What	Next		Beginning	with	onset	of	the	21st	century,	UNESCO’s	“soft	power”	has	been	used	to	promote	a	paradigmatic	 shift	 towards	 more	 local,	 community-oriented	 interventions	 for	 the	safeguarding	of	intangible	cultural	heritage	(2003	UNESCO	Convention),17	seeing	it	as	a	factor	enhancing	 intergenerational	 transmission.	 This	 approach	 also	 inspires	 the	 UNESCO	Convention	 on	 the	 Protection	 of	 the	 Underwater	 Cultural	 Heritage	 (2001	 UNESCO	Convention),18	which	makes	 the	 in	 situ	 preservation	 of	 underwater	 cultural	heritage	 as	 the	first	option,	and	prohibits	the	commercial	exploitation	for	trade	or	speculation	of	underwater	cultural	heritage.		In	 order	 to	 support	 States’	 actions	 to	 preserve	 and	 defend	 cultural	 and	 linguistic	diversity,	UNESCO	decided	next	to	promote	and	protect	the	diversity	of	cultural	expressions	
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
juridiques	 et	 pratiques	 judiciaires	 du	 Moyen-Âge	 à	 l'époque	 contemporaine,	 editeb	 by	 Benoît		 Garnot,	 Dijon:	Éditions	universitaires	de	Dijon,	2007,		pp.	347-355.	16	See	Manlio	Frigo,	The	Implementation	of	Directive	2014/60/EU	and	the	Problems	of	the	Compliance	of	Italian	
Legislation	with	International	and	EU	Law,	Santander	Art	and	Culture	Law	Review	2,	no.	2	(2016):	71-84,	at	72.	17	UNESCO	Convention	 for	 the	 Safeguarding	 of	 the	 Intangible	Cultural	Heritage,	 17	October	 2003,	 in	 force	 20	April	2006,	2368	UNTS	1.	18 UNESCO	Convention	 on	 the	 Protection	 of	 the	 Underwater	 Cultural	 Heritage,	 2	November	 2001,	 in	 force	 2	January	2009,	UNESCO	Doc.31C/Resolution	24.	
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(2005	UNESCO	Convention).19	 This	 new	path	 is	 characterized	 by	 a	 growing	 awareness	 that	non-European	States	and	their	intangible	cultural	heritage	are	an	important	factor	in	bringing	human	 beings	 closer	 together	 and	 ensuring	 understanding	 among	 them.	 The	 international	community	 enhanced	 international	 cooperation	 in	 the	 cultural	 heritage	 sphere	 to	safeguarding	 global	 security,	 peace	 and	 development.	 UNESCO	 and	 UN	 Security	 Council	(UNSC)	 thus	 strengthened	 their	 cooperation	 in	 this	 field.	 Since	 the	 wars	 in	 Kuwait	 (1990-1991)	 and	 Iraq	 (2003),	 the	 UNSC	 has	 become	 an	 important	 global	 cultural	 heritage	 law-maker.	The	UNSC,	acting	under	Chapter	VII	of	the	UN	Charter,	established	binding	obligations	supplementing	the	existing	legal	frameworks	in	the	area	of	cultural	heritage.	The	tragedies	in	Syria	and	Iraq	gave	rise	to	three	ad	hoc	instruments,	strongly	supported	by	UNESCO,	but	there	are	 other	 ad	 hoc	 binding	 resolutions	 of	 the	 UN	 Security	 Council	 dealing	 with	 the	 illicit	trafficking	 in	 cultural	 property.	 UN	 SC	 Resolution	 No.	 2347	 of	 24	 March	 201720	 creates	binding	 obligations	 as	 it	 “requests	Member	 States	 to	 take	 appropriate	 steps	 to	 prevent	 and	counter	the	illicit	trade	and	trafficking	in	cultural	property	and	other	items	of	archaeological,	historical,	 cultural,	 rare	 scientific,	 and	 religious	 importance	 originating	 from	 a	 context	 of	armed	 conflict”,	 and	 “urges	 Member	 States	 to	 introduce	 effective	 national	 measures	 at	 the	legislative	and	operational	levels	where	appropriate,	and	in	accordance	with	obligations	and	commitments	 under	 international	 law	 and	 national	 instruments,	 to	 prevent	 and	 counter	trafficking	in	cultural	property	and	related	offences”.		Besides	 UNESCO,	 also	 the	 EU	 strengthened	 its	 cooperation	 with	 the	 UN	 Security	Council,	to	respond	to	international	crime	and	implement	UNSC	binding	resolutions.	Since	the	Iraqi-Kuwait	conflict,21	the	EU	announced	its	determination	to	combat	the	illicit	trafficking	of	cultural	 property,	 as	 highlighted	 also	 by	 the	 1992	 Framework	 Decision	 on	 the	 European	arrest	warrant.	 This	 instrument	 is	 applicable	 	 to	 the	 offence	 of	 illicit	 trafficking	 in	 cultural	goods,	 including	antiques	and	works	of	 art	 (Article	2(2)).22	The	 framework	decision	on	 the	
                                                             19	 UNESCO	 Convention	on	 the	 Protection	 and	 Promotion	 of	 the	Diversity	 of	 Cultural	 Expressions.	 20	 October	2005,	in	force	18	March	2007,	in	UNESCO,	Records	of	the	General	Conference,	33rd	session,	Paris,	3-21	October	2005,	(2	vols,	2005),	vol.	I,	at	83.	20	Resolution	2347:		Maintenance	of	international	peace	and	security,	UN	Doc	S/RES/2347	(2017).	
21 See	UNSC	Resolution	661	(1990)	and	subsequent	relevant	Resolutions,	in	particular	Resolution	986	(1995)		by	which	the	Council	imposed	a	comprehensive	embargo	on	trade	with	Iraq. 22	Council	Framework	Decision	of	13	June	2002	on	the	European	arrest	warrant	and	the	surrender	procedures	between	 Member	 States,	 OJ	 L	 190,	 18/07/2002.	 For	 a	 broader	 view	 of	 the	 tools	 available	 to	 combat	 the	trafficking	of	 cultural	properly	 in	 the	EU	see	 the	Study	on	preventing	and	 fighting	 illicit	 trafficking	 in	cultural	
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European	 arrest	warrant	 is	 not	 the	 only	measure	 that	 applies	 to	 the	 trafficking	 of	 cultural	property;	 other	 measures	 fall	 under	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	European	 Union	 (TFEU),	 in	 particular	 with	 a	 view	 to	 avoiding	 distortion	 of	 competition.23	According	 to	 the	 European	 institutions,	 the	 Union’s	 legislation	 should	 implement	 all	 the	relevant	 decisions	 of	 the	 Security	 Council	 as	 far	 as	 the	 territory	 of	 the	 Community	 is	concerned.	The	ongoing	destruction,	looting	and	trafficking	in	cultural	property,	especially	in	the	Middle	East	(Iraq,	Syria,	and	in	other	countries	of	this	region	among	others)	demonstrated	the	need	for	the	European	Union	to	move	beyond	a	protection	regime	that	applied	only	to	the	cultural	heritage	of	EU	Member	States.	The	EU	thus	adopted	Regulation	1210/2003	on	Iraqi	cultural	 property24	 and	Regulation	 1332/2013	on	 Syrian	 cultural	 property,25	 both	of	which	ban	 the	 import,	 export	 and	 trade	 in	 cultural	objects:	 these	 regulations	 indicate	 that	Europe	has	 opted	 for	 a	 strong	 direct	 policy	 against	 the	 illicit	 trafficking	 in	 cultural	 property	 also	outside	 its	borders.	The	way	the	perception	of	 illicit	 traffic	 in	cultural	goods	has	changed	 is	reflected	in	the	increasing	visibility	of	cultural	heritage	in	EU	public	policy.26		A	 recent	 initiative	by	 the	European	Union,	 stemming	 from	 the	UNSC	res.	2347	of	24	March	 2017	 (above	 mentioned)	 and	 from	 the	 agenda	 of	 the	 European	 Year	 of	 Cultural	Heritage	 (2018),	 is	 the	 Proposal	 for	 a	 Regulation	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	Council	on	the	 import	of	cultural	goods	presented	 in	 July	2017.27	The	proposal	put	 forward	new	rules	to	ban	all	illegal	import	and	trafficking	of	cultural	goods	from	outside	the	EU,	often	linked	 to	 terrorist	 financing	and	other	 criminal	 activity.	The	new	rules	 foresee	a	number	of	actions	that	should	make	the	 importation	of	 illicit	cultural	goods	much	more	difficult.	These	include	 the	 introduction	 of	a	 new	 licensing	 system	for	 the	 import	 of	 archaeological	 objects,	parts	of	monuments	and	ancient	manuscripts	and	books,	a	more	rigorous	certification	system	for	 the	 importers,	who	will	have	 to	 submit	a	 signed	statement	or	affidavit	 as	proof	 that	 the	
                                                                                                                                                                                                          goods	in	the	European	Union	by	the	CECOJI-CNRS	–	UMR	6224,	prepared	for	the	EU,	Final	report,	2011,	available	at	https://publications.europa.eu/,	[accessed	on	9.9.2017].		23	 See	 the	 Treaty	 consolidated	 version,	 OJ	 C	 326,	 26.10.2012,	 p.	 47,	 and	 the	 Council	 Regulation	 (EC)	 No	1210/2003	of	7	July	2003	concerning	certain	specific	restrictions	on	economic	and	financial	relations	with	Iraq.	and	repealing	Regulation	(EC)	No.	2465/96,	OJ	L	169,	8.07.2003,	p.	6,	at	paragraph	8.	24Council	Regulation	(EC)	No.	1210/2003	of	7	July	2003	concerning	certain	specific	restrictions	on	economic	and	financial	relations	with	Iraq	and	repealing	Regulation	(EC)	No.	2465/96,	OJ	L	169,	8.07.2003,	p.	6.		25Council	 Regulation	 (EU)	 No.	 1332/2013	 of	 13	 December	 2013	 amending	 Regulation	 (EU)	 No.	 36/2012	concerning	restrictive	measures	in	view	of	the	situation	in	Syria,	OJ	L	335,	14.12.2013,	p.	3.		26	 Security	 Union:	 Cracking	 down	 on	 the	 illegal	 import	 of	 cultural	 goods	 used	 to	 finance	 terrorism,	 Cf	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1932_en.htm.	27	Brussels,	13.7.2017,	COM(2017)	375	final,	2017/0158	(COD).	
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goods	have	been	exported	legally	from	the	third	country.	With	the	aim	of	ensuring	an	effective	protection,	 the	 proposal	 of	 the	 forthcoming	 EU	 Regulation	 introduces	 a	new	 common	definition	for	“cultural	goods	at	importation”,	which	covers	a	broad	range	of	objects	including	archaeological	 finds,	 ancient	 scrolls,	 the	 remains	 of	 historical	 monuments,	 artwork,	collections	and	antiques	and	which	applies	only	to	cultural	goods	that	have	been	shown	to	be	most	 at	 risk	 (i.e.	 those	 at	 least	 250	 years	 old	at	 the	moment	of	 importation).	 Trafficking	 of	cultural	 goods	 through	 illicit	 importing,	 exporting	and	 transferring	of	ownership	of	 cultural	property,	 is	 indeed	a	pressing	 issue	 for	 the	European	Commission.	The	Commission	 is	 thus	considering	 further	 actions	 to	 each	 country’s	 cultural	 property	 against	 all	 the	 dangers	resulting	 from	 organised	 crime,	 money	 laundering	 and	 terrorism.28The	 global	 concern	 for	criminal	 activities	 related	 to	 cultural	 goods,	 beyond	 the	 EU	 dimension	 but	 affecting	 the	internal	law	of	the	Member	States,	is	currently	reflected	by	the	intense	activity	of	the	Council	of	 Europe	 on	 these	 issues.	 In	 the	 same	 vein,	 indeed,	 more	 recently	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe	commenced	work	on	a	new	draft	Convention	on	offences	relating	to	cultural	property.29	As	a	result,	the	Nicosia	Convention	was	finalized	in	May	2017,	and	it	is	now	open	for	signature.30	The	 European	 Convention	 on	 Offences	 relating	 to	 Cultural	 Property	 (Delphi,	 1985)	 never	entered	 into	 force,31	 and	 as	 none	 of	 the	 international	 instruments	 deal	 with	 criminal	 law	issues,	in	April	2015,	the	ministers	responsible	for	cultural	heritage	from	the	50	States	parties	to	 the	European	Cultural	Convention	(Paris,	1954)32	adopted	the	Namur	Call.	With	this	call,	the	ministers	condemned	“the	deliberate	destruction	of	cultural	heritage	and	the	trafficking	of	cultural	 property”	 and	 decided	 to	 “reinforce	 European	 cooperation	 to	 prevent	 and	 punish	such	acts”.	They	aimed	to	protect	cultural	property	belonging	to	peoples,	which	“constitutes	a	unique	and	important	testimony	of	the	culture	and	identity	of	such	peoples,	and	forms	their	cultural	heritage”33	The	Council	of	Europe	 then	prepared	 the	Nicosia	Convention	which	has	
                                                             28	 For	 more	 information	 on	 further	 initiatives:	 https://ec.europa.eu/culture/policy/culture-policies/trafficking_en	[accessed	on	9.9.2017].	29	 CM(2017)	 32,	 19	 April	 2017,	 European	 Committee	 on	 Crime	 Problems	 (CDPC),	 Draft	 Council	 of	 Europe	Convention	on	Offences	relating	to	Cultural	Property.	30	3	May	2017,	CETS	no.	221.	31	23	June	1985,	ETS	No.119.	32	19	December	1954,	ETS	No.	018.	33	CM(2017)	32,	cit.	note	29.	
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been	 just	 signed	by	 seven	States34.	The	Convention	applies	 to	 the	prevention,	 investigation,	and	prosecution	of	the	criminal	offences	relating	to	movable	and	immovable	cultural	property	(Article	2),	in	particular	their	unlawful	destruction	or	damaging,	and	their	unlawful	removal,	in	 whole	 or	 in	 part	 (Article	 10).	 The	 Convention	 aims	 to	 build	 on	 instruments	 relating	 to	cultural	property	such	as	the	1970	UNESCO	Convention	and	the	1995	UNIDROIT	Convention	in	order	to	make	it	compatible	with	relevant	existing	international	and	supranational	legally	binding	 standards.	According	 to	Article	2	of	 the	Nicosia	Convention,	 States	are	 sovereign	 in	the	 designation	of	what	 constitutes	 their	 own	 cultural	 property,	 as	was	 the	 case	 under	 the	1970	UNESCO	Convention.	 In	addition,	 the	 term	 “cultural	property”	means	property	which,	“on	 religious	 or	 secular	 grounds,	 is	 specifically	 designated	 by	 each	 State	 as	 being	 of	importance	for	archaeology,	prehistory,	history,	literature,	art	or	science”	(Article	1)	the	loss	of	which	would	constitute	“the	impoverishment	of	the	cultural	heritage	of	that	State”	(Article	2).35	 	 So	 far	 sovereign	 States	 have	 the	 power	 and	 the	 ultimate	 authority	 to	 protect	 their	national	 cultural	 heritage.	 However,	 in	 the	 age	 of	 global	 actors,	 national	 (internal)	 cultural	States’	 interests	 are	 being	 gradually	 replaced	 by	 more	 sophisticated	 and	 transversal	aggregators	of	interests,	grounded	on	different	core-values,	above	all	the	preservation	of	and	public	access	to	the	cultural	heritage	of	mankind.			
4. Self-Regulation	Tools:		Codes	of	Ethics	and	OMC	Recommendations	
		Two	different	forces	are	pushing	the	inter-state	dialogue	on	cultural	heritage:	on	one	hand,	in	this	 field	 there	 is	 a	 growing	 recourse	 to	 criminal	 law	 rules	 as	 highlighted	 in	 the	 previous	section,	 and	 on	 the	 other,	 we	 witness	 the	 development	 of	 best	 practices	 and	 guidelines,	namely	of	 soft	 law	 instruments	adopted	by	way	of	 self-regulation.	The	phenomenon	of	 soft	law	and	the	role	that	self-regulation	plays	in	helping	mainly	professionals	(but	also	citizens)	to	understand	and	enjoy	the	diversity	of	their	cultural	heritage	is	not	hard	to	grasp:	one	may	consider,	 as	an	example,	 the	 codes	of	 ethics	elaborated	by	a	variety	of	 subjects,	 such	as	 the	Code	of	Ethics	and	the	Guidelines	of	the	American	Association	of	Museums	(AAM),	the	Code	of	
                                                             34	 To	 check	 the	 full	 list	 see	 http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/221/signatures?p_auth=3cKMoo4F	35	Robert	Peters,	The	Protection	of	Cultural	Property:	Recent	Developments	in	Germany	in	the	Context	of	New	EU	
Law	and	the	1970	UNESCO	Convention,	Santander	Art	and	Culture	Law	Review	2,	no.	2	(2016):	85-102.		
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Ethics	 for	Museums	belonging	to	the	International	Council	Museums	(ICOM),	 the	Guidelines	on	Loans	of	Antiquities	and	Ancient	art	of	the	Association	of	Art	Museum	Directors	(AAMD),36	the	 Code	 of	 Ethics	 of	 CINOA	 (Confédération	 internationale	 des	 Négociants	 d’oeuvres	
d’art/International	Confederation	of	Art	&	Antique	dealer	associations)	and	the	role	they	play.	Despite	 their	 non-binding	 nature,	 these	 “Codes”37	 influence	 both	 social	 behaviours	 and	market	rules	 through	their	reputational	effect.	UNESCO	has	also	shown	to	be	aware	of	 their	effects,	 and	has	prepared	an	International	Code	of	Ethics	 for	Dealers	 in	Cultural	Property,	a	model	Code	of	conduct	establishing	standards	intended	to	influence	the	exchange	of	cultural	objects.38	Soft	 law	has	also	had	a	clear	 impact	on	hard	 law,	demonstrated	by	the	concept	of	due	 diligence	 contained	 in	Article	 4(1)	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 1995	UNIDROIT	Convention.	Finally,	 soft	 law	 represents	 a	 fundamental	 driving	 force	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 new	international	 customary	 law	 applicable	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 cultural	 heritage.39	 In	 fact,	 in	accordance	 with	 both	 customary	 and	 codified	 international	 law,	 the	 cultural	 property	 of	 a	foreign	 State	 enjoys	 immunity	 from	 execution	 when	 the	 cultural	 object	 belonging	 to	 the	foreign	State	is	on	temporary	loan	to	another	State	or	foreign	museum	for	an	exhibition	(the	so-called	 “immunity	 from	 seizure”).40	 As	 the	 Action	 Plan	 for	 the	 EU	 Promotion	 of	Museum	Collections’	 Mobility	 and	 Loan	 Standards	 200641	 suggested,	 the	 mobility	 of	 museum	collections,	 i.e.	 the	 lending	 and	 borrowing	 of	 cultural	 objects	 and	 works	 of	 art,	 has	 been	
                                                             36	Manlio	 Frigo,	Le	 rôle	 des	 règles	 de	 déontologie	 entre	 droit	 de	 l’art	 et	 régulation	 du	marché,	 Journal	 du	Droit	
international	 134,	 no.	 3	 (Juillet-Août-Septembre	 2007):	 883	 –	 898	;	 Pierpaolo	 Forte,	 Codice	 etico	 di	 ICOM	 d	
disciplina	dei	musei	in	Italia,	AEDON,	no.	2	(2010)	http://www.aedon.mulino.it/archivio/2010/2/forte.htm.	37	With	respect	to	the	variations	in	the	meaning	of	the	term	‘Code’,	see	among	others:	Paolo	Cappellini,	Bernardo	Sordi	(eds.),	Codici:	Una	riflessione	di	 fine	millennio,	Milano:Giuffrè,	2002.	For	more	on	the	codification	of	rules	concerning	 cultural	 goods,	 see:	 Sabino	Cassese,	 Codici	 e	 codificazioni:	 Italia	 e	 Francia	 e	 confronto,	Giornale	 di	
diritto	amministrativo,	11.	No.	1	(2005):	95-97;	and	Lorenzo	Casini,	La	codificazione	del	diritto	dei	beni	culturali	in	
Italia	e	in	Francia,	Giornale	di	diritto	amministrativo,	11,	no.	1	(2005):	98-104.	38	CLT/CH/INS-06/25	rev.,	adopted	in	1999.	The	Code	aims	to	give	effect	to	the	provisions	of	the	1970	UNESCO	Convention	and	1995	UNIDROIT	Convention.	It	was	developed	based	on	the	experience	of	French,	Dutch,	Swiss	and	the	United	Kingdom	professional	Codes	of	practice,	as	well	as	on	the	Code	of	conduct	of	the	CINOA.	39	Francesco	Francioni,	La	protezione	internazionale	dei	beni	culturali:	un	diritto	consuetudinario	in	formazione?	in	Paolo	Benvenuti,	Rosario	Sapienza	(eds.),	La	tutela	internazionale	dei	beni	culturali	nei	conflitti	armati,	Milano:	Giuffrè,	2007,	3	ff;	Ibid.,	Plurality	and	Interaction	of	Legal	Orders	in	the	Enforcement	of	Cultural	Heritage	Law,	in		Francesco	 	Francioni,	 James	Gordley	(eds.),	Enforcing	International	Cultural	Heritage	Law,	London	–	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013,	9	ff.;	M.	Frigo,	cit.	note	36.	40		Nout	van	Woudenberg,	State	Immunity	and	Cultural	Objects	on	Loan,	Leiden	–	Boston:	Martinus	Nijhoff,,	2012;	also	see	Chapter	9	in	this	book.	41	 The	Action	Plan	contributed	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	Council	 Resolution	 13839/04,	which	established	 the	mobility	 	of	works	of	art,	 art	 collections	and	exhibitions	as	one	of	 five	priorities	 in	 the	Work	Plan	 for	Culture	2005—2006:	 See	 http://www.lending-for-europe.eu/fileadmin/CM/public/documents/policy/Action_Plan_for_the_EU_Promotion.pdf,	 at	 4	 [accessed	 on	25.6.2017].	
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concretized	through	best	practices,	commonly	applied	loan	standards	and	guarantee	schemes,	provided	by	EU	Member	States	and	museums	of	various	sizes	and	in	all	parts	of	the	European	Union.		The	 Commission	 Communication	 on	 a	 European	Agenda	 for	 Culture	 in	 a	 Globalizing	World	 2007	 required	 a	 wider	 reflection	 on	 the	 role	 of	 culture	 as	 a	 key	 element	 of	 the	European	 integration	 process.	 In	 order	 to	 implement	 its	 objectives,	 it	 introduced	 a	 new	cooperation	method	-	the	Open	Method	of	Coordination	(OMC)	-	as	a	more	structured	system	of	 cooperation	 between	 Member	 States	 and	 EU	 institutions.	 Four	 groups	 of	 experts	 from	Member	States	have	been	set	up,	addressing	(among	other	issues):	the	mobility	of	collections,	including	the	value	of	cooperation	and	reciprocity;	the	need	to	reduce	the	costs	of	lending	and	borrowing;	 the	 need	 to	 explore	 new	 non-traditional	 modalities	 of	 mobility;	 and	 the	importance	 of	 assessing	 the	 essential	 requirements	 for	 due	 diligence,	 particularly	 in	researching	the	provenance	of	cultural	objects.	Experts	 from	25	Member	States	participated	in	the	mobility	of	collections	working	group;	five	sub-groups	were	identified	and	hundreds	of	professionals	around	Europe	were	involved	in	and	contributed	to	their	work.	The	OMC	is	a	very	fruitful	method	which	allows	detailed	recommendations	to	be	addressed	to	different	target	audiences,	such	as	Cultural	Affairs	Committee	representatives,	Member	States	(officials	working	 in	ministries	with	 responsibility	 for	 Culture;	 Finance,	 Justice	 and	Foreign	affairs	ministries;	and	politicians),	museum	workers	(directors,	heads	of	collections,	curators,	registrars	 and	 exhibitions	 staff)	 and	 professional	 networks	 including	 NEMO	 (Network	 of	European	 Museum	 Organizations)	 and	 ICOM,	 European	 Registrars	 Group,	 International	Exhibitions	Organisers	group,	and	the	Bizot	Group	of	Museum	Directors.	However,	precisely	owing	 to	 this	 multi-faceted	 input,	 the	 Final	 Report	 and	 Recommendations	 to	 the	 Cultural	Affairs	Committee	on	 Improving	 the	Means	of	 Increasing	 the	Mobility	of	Collections	 (2010)	elaborated	by	the	OMC	is	complex	and	not	easy	to	grasp.42		
5. Cultural	Heritage:		a	Strategic	Resource			
                                                             42	 See	 http://www.lending-for-europe.eu/fileadmin/CM/internal/OMC/OMC_Mobility_of_Collections_Report_Rome_7_July10.pdf	 [accessed:	25.6.2017].	
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Despite	what	has	been	said	above,	soft	standards	on	the	one	hand	and	criminal	rules	on	the	other	 are	 not	 the	 hallmarks	 of	 our	 times.	 Instead,	 the	 symbol	 of	 the	 present	 time	 is	 the	instrumental	use	of	culture,	which	is	not	a	new	phenomenon	at	all	(in	some	legal	systems	it	has	 been	 particularly	 noticeable43),	 but	 one	 that	 has	 become	 a	widespread	 global	 strategy.	The	European	Union	has	recently	defined	cultural	heritage	as	one	of	the	“strategic	resources”	for	 a	 sustainable	 Europe,	 and	 actively	 seeks	 to	 strengthen	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 the	European	 cultural	 and	 creative	 sectors	 (Creative	 Europe	 2011).44	 Article	 2	 of	 Regulation	1295/201345	 establishing	 the	 Creative	 Europe	 Programme	 affirms	 that	 cultural	 heritage	 is	“included”	 in	 the	 cultural	 and	creative	 sectors,	whose	activities	are	based	on	cultural	 values	and/or	artistic	 and	other	 creative	expressions,	whether	 these	activities	are	market-	or	non-market-oriented,	regardless	of	the	type	of	structures	that	carry	them	out,	and	irrespective	of	how	 that	 structure	 is	 financed.46	The	goals	 are	 to	 first	map	all	 the	activities	with	a	 cultural	dimension	 within	 the	 common	 market,	 and	 then	 to	 foster	 a	 European	 cultural	 heritage	through	a	variety	of	policies:	 social	 cohesion,	 tourism,	environmental	policy,	 education,	 and	the	digital	agenda.		This	 vast	 programme	 may	 be	 considered	 as	 the	 European	 attempt	 to	 find	 a	compromise	 between	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 market	 and	 cultural	 heritage	 protection.	 The	 debate	over	whether	works	of	art	should	in	general	be	a	tradable	commodity	at	all	is	well	known.47	A	compromise	solution,	according	to	the	European	institutions,	has	been	reached	in	Regulation	
                                                             43	As	for	example	in	the	Central	and	Eastern	European	Countries	under	the	Soviet	regime,	or	in	the	Chinese	legal	system,	and	-	although	not	readily	observed	-	even	within	the	Western	legal	tradition.	See	respectively	Hedwig	De	Smaele,	Mass	Media	and	the	Information	Climate	in	Russia,	Europe-Asia	Studies.	59,	No.	8	(Dec.,	2007):	1299-1313;	 Ann	 Kent,	 China,	 the	 United	 Nations,	 and	 Human	 Rights:	 The	 Limits	 of	 Compliance,	 Philadelphia:	Pennsylvania	 University	 Press,	1999,	 24	 ff.	 In	 general	 see	George	 Yúdice,	 The	 Expediency	 of	 Culture:	 Uses	 of	
Culture	in	the	Global	Era,	Durham	-	London:	Duke	University	Press,	2004.	44	Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	the	Council,	 the	European	Economic	and	Social	 Committee	and	 the	 Committee	 of	 the	Regions	 Creative	 Europe	 -	 A	 new	 framework	programme	 for	 the	cultural	and	creative	sectors	(2014-2020),	COM/2011/0786	final.	This	is	the	European	Commission’s	framework	for	the	promotion	of	the	culture	and	audiovisual	sectors.	45	Regulation	(EU)	1295/2013	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	11	December	2013	establishing	the	Creative	Europe	Programme	(2014	to	2020),	OJ	L	347,	20.12.2013,	p.	221–237.		46	 “The	cultural	 and	 creative	 sectors	 include,	 inter	 alia,	 architecture,	 archives,	 libraries	 and	museums,	 artistic	crafts,	 audiovisual	 (including	 film,	 television,	 video	 games	 and	 multimedia),	 tangible	 and	 intangible	 cultural	heritage,	design,	festivals,	music,	literature,	performing	arts,	publishing,	radio	and	visual	arts	(…)”.	47	See	for	instance	Judith	H.	Dobrzynski,	Commentary,	Brandeis’	Wretched	museum	Closure,	Forbes.com,	February	4,	2009.	
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116/200948	 on	 the	 export	 of	 cultural	 goods,	 which	 did	 not	 introduce	major	 changes	 to	 its	predecessor	 of	 1992,	 	 and	 Regulation	 1215/2012,49	 which	 established,	 for	 the	 internal	market,	a	rule	of	private	international	law	in	favour	of	the	owner	of	a	cultural	object,	who	will	be	able	to	initiate	proceedings	as	regards	a	civil	claim	for	its	recovery	in	the	court	of	the	place	where	the	cultural	object	is	situated	at	the	time	the	court	is	seized	(a	rule	already	provided	by	Article	8(1)	1995	UNIDROIT	Convention);	and	finally	in	Directive	2014/6050	on	the	return	of	national	treasures	exported	illegally	from	one	Member	State	to	another,	which	puts	pressure	on	the	owner	of	a	cultural	object,	who	is	under	the	obligation	to	exercise	due	diligence	with	respect	 to	 its	 provenance.51	 In	 particular	 the	 new	 Directive,	 which	 recasts	 Directive	 93/7,	supports	 the	 “cultural	 argument”	 for	 claiming	the	 restitution	of	 these	objects.52	The	general	objective	 of	 both	 Regulation	 116/2009	 and	 Directive	 2014/60	 is	 to	 achieve	 a	 better	compromise	between	the	principle	of	free	movement	of	cultural	goods	and	the	protection	of	cultural	heritage.	They	do	not	provide	a	definition	of	“national	treasure”	but	they	restrict	the	perimeter	of	possible	returns	as	much	as	possible:	indeed	only	objects	classified	by	the	States	as	 “national	 treasures”	are	 subject	 to	 the	 right	of	 return.	Once	more,	 the	 role	played	 in	 this	matter	by	the	States	is	crucial.		In	particular,	honouring	mutual	 trust,	Member	States	would	have	to	defer	 to	another	Member	State’s	competence	over	what	is	to	be	considered	its	“national	treasure”;	at	the	same	time,	they	should	also	confirm	whether	a	certain	object	is	a	“national	treasure”	under	the	law	of	another	Member	State.	The	glue	that	holds	the	States	together	in	protecting	their	cultural	heritage	 is	 therefore	an	attentive	and	active	 trust.	Clearly	 this	 is	no	 simple	 task.	 It	 requires	taking	into	consideration	the	15	categories	listed	in	the	previous	Annexes	of	both	Regulation	
                                                             48	Council	Regulation	(EC)	No.	116/2009	of	18	December	2008	on	the	export	of	cultural	goods	(codified	version),	OJ	L	39,	10.02.2009,	p.	1.	49	 Regulation	 (EU)	 No.	 1215/2012	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 12	 December	 2012	 on	jurisdiction	 and	 the	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 judgments	 in	 civil	 and	 commercial	 matters,	 OJ	 L	 351,	20.12.2012,	p.	1.	50	Directive	2014/60/EU	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	15	May	2014	on	the	return	of	cultural	objects	unlawfully	removed	from	the	territory	of	a	Member	State	and	amending	Regulation	(EU)	No.	1024/2012,	OJ	L	159,	28.05.2014,	p.	1.	51	The	possessor	has	to	prove	(by	documentation)	the	provenance	of	the	object,	the	authorization	for	its	removal	under	 the	 law	 of	 the	 requesting	Member	 State,	 the	 character	 of	 the	 parties,	 the	 price	 paid,	 and	whether	 the	possessor	consulted	any	accessible	register	of	stolen	cultural	objects	or	took	such	other	steps	as	any	reasonable	person	 would	 have	 taken	 in	 the	 circumstances.	 Art.	 10	 Directive,	 inspired	 by	 Art.	 4(4)	 1995	 UNIDROIT	Convention.	52	Marie	Cornu,	Recasting	restitution:	interactions	between	EU	and	International	Law,	Uniform	Law	Review	20,	no.	4	(2015):	637-646	at	642.	
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3911/92	and	Directive	93/7,	which	are	rather	ambiguous.	The	Annex	to	Regulation	3911/92	is	 still	 in	 force	 (Reg.	 116/2009)	 and	 it	 provides	 only	 rough	 filters	 for	 national	 cultural	treasures	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 age	 and	 financial	 thresholds	 (while	 most	 Member	 States	 do	 not	categorize	their	national	treasures	on	the	basis	of	monetary	value).	The	Annex	to	the	Directive	93/7	was	 repealed	 (Dir.	2014/60),	but	 it	 is	 still	used	as	a	 reference	 criterion,	 although	 it	 is	difficult	for	a	cultural	object	to	be	protected	to	meet	the	criteria	contained	in	the	15	categories	listed	in	the	Annex	to	the	previous	Directive.53	As	is	well	known,	this	has	been	one	of	the	main	obstacles	 to	 its	application,	 in	addition	to	the	burden	of	proof	with	respect	 to	possession	 in	good	faith	and	the	short	time	period	for	Member	States	to	initiate	a	return	procedure.54		As	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 application	 of	 both	 Regulation	 116/2009	 and	 Directive	2014/60	 requires	 active	 trust	 and	 mutual	 solidarity	 between	 EU	 Member	 States.	 The	cooperation	 between	 Member	 States	 is	 facilitated	 through	 the	 new	 administrative	 system	(made	 available	 in	 June	 2016)	 which	 enables	 EU	 Member	 States	 authorities	 to	 rapidly	exchange	 information	 through	 the	 IMI	 system.55	 	 This	 will	 require	 each	 Member	 State	 to	control	not	only	the	export	of	the	State’s	own	national	cultural	property,	but	also	the	import	of	the	 national	 property	 of	 another	 Member	 State.56	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 protection	 of	 a	 State’s	cultural	treasure	and	the	protection	of	cultural	treasures	belonging	to	other	States	are	really	the	 two	 sides	 of	 the	 same	 coin.	 Under	 this	 regime,	 the	 competence	 for	 cultural	matters	 is	firmly	in	the	hands	of	the	Member	States,	with	only	a	marginal,	complementary	competence	for	the	European	Union.	The	main	difficulty	thus	lies	in	defining	what	is	a	“national	treasure”.	Without	 a	 braver,	 clearer,	 and	 harmonized	 demarcation	 of	 this	 notion,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 a	substantial	number	of	applications	channelled	through	the	IMI	system	will	not	actually	refer	
                                                             53	Marja	van	Heese,	The	Implementation	of	Directive	2014/60/EU	in	the	Netherlands,	Santander	Art	and	Culture	
Law	Review	2,	no.	2	(2016):	103-118,	at	115.		54		van	Heese	cit.,	previous	note:	“The	possibly	high	costs	of	a	legal	procedure	(lawyers’	fees,	court	fee,	and	fees	for	witnesses	and	experts,	as	well	as	seizure	costs	and	costs	for	transport,	storage	and	insurance)	require	one	to	think	twice	about	the	application	of	the	Directive”.		55	 Olgierd	 Jakubowski,	 The	 Internal	 Market	 Information	 System	 (IMI)	 on	 the	 Return	 of	 Cultural	 Objects	 –	 Its	
Principles,	Application,	and	Evaluation	of	Its	Effectiveness	for	the	Protection	of	Cultural	Heritage,	Santander	Art	and	
Culture	 Law	 Review	 2,	 no.	 2	 (2016):	 247-262,	 at	 290:	 “Central	 authorities	 must	 cooperate	 and	 provide	consultation,	 using	the	 IMI	 system,	 in	 order	 to	 search	 for	 a	 specified	 cultural	 object	 that	 has	 been	unlawfully	removed,	as	well	as	the	identity	of	its	possessor,	to	notify	the	requesting	state	of	its	discovery	of	such	a	cultural	object,	to	enable	the	requesting	State	to	check	on	the	cultural	object,	and	to	act	as	an	intermediary	with	regards	to	its	return.	The	IMI	module	raises	some	questions	related	to	the	storage	of	personal	data	and	to	the	way	courts	will	approach	these	data	in	the	context	of	submission	of	evidence	in	court	cases	for	the	return	of	cultural	objects.		56	Peters,	cit.	note	35,	at	92.	
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to	 a	 designated	 category	 of	 cultural	 objects.57	 The	 legal	 solutions	 introduced	 by	 Directive	2014/60	may	thus	have	limited	effectiveness.			
6. National	Treasures	and	Cultural	Heritage:	Strict	Exceptions	to	Free	Trade	
	As	established	by	both	the	General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade	(GATT)	of	1947	and	the	1994	WTO	Agreement,58	as	well	as	by	the	European	Treaties,	Member	States	have	the	right	to	restrict	 the	 free	movement	 of	 some	 particular	 objects	 to	 protect	 their	 “national	 treasures”	(Article	XX(f)	WTO	and	Article	36	TFEU	respectively).		According	to	Article	36	TFEU,	the	Member	States	can	deviate	from	the	rules	aimed	at	ensuring	the	free	movement	of	goods	through	restrictive	measures	taken	to	protect	national	treasures	 “possessing	 artistic,	 historic	 or	 archaeological	 value”.	 These	 measures	 cannot,	however,	 constitute	 a	 means	 of	 “arbitrary	 discrimination”,	 nor	 a	 “disguised	 restriction”	 on	trade	between	Member	States.		In	 fact,	 outstanding	works	 of	 visual	 arts	 or	 archaeological	 artefacts	 of	 a	 certain	 age,	typically	 found	 in	 museums,	 are	 under	 protection.59	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 the	 Member	States	 can	 derogate	 from	 the	 internal	 market	 rules	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 above	 mentioned	exception	only	for	a	class	of	objects	that	represent	the	“essential	and	fundamental	elements	of	national	artistic	patrimony”.60		This	view,	which	was	expressed	not	only	with	respect	to	art61,	is	 generally	 supported	 with	 reference	 to	 the	 cultural	 patrimony	 of	 a	 nation.62	 A	Communication	issued	by	the	Commission	on	the	verge	of	the	removal	of	the	internal	barriers	
                                                             57		Jakubowski,	cit	note	55.	
58 The	WTO	–	GATT	system	provides	a	“cultural	exception”	in	Article	XX	(f):	see	General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade,	15	April	1994,	1867	UNTS	187;	Marrakesh	Agreement	Establishing	the	World	Trade	Organization,	15	April	1994,	1867	UNTS	3;	cf	Sandrine	Cahn,	Daniel	Schimmel,	The	Cultural	Exception:	Does	It	Exist	in	GATT	and	
GATS	Frameworks?	How	Does	It	Affect	or	 is	Affected	by	the	Agreement	on	TRIPS?,	Cardozo	Arts	&	Entertainment	
Law	Journal	15	(1997):	281-314.	59	 Jingxia	Shi,	Free	Trade	and	Cultural	Diversity	 in	 International	Law,	Oxford	Portland:	Oregon	Hart	Publishing,	2013,	at	145.	60	Pierre	Pescatore,	Le	Commerce	de	l’art	et	le	Marché	Commun,	Revue	trimestrielle	de	droit	européen	21	(1985):	451-462,	at	451;	The	author	was	the	rapporteur	in	the	ECJ	Case	7-68,	Commission	of	the	European	Communities	v.	Italian	Republic,	Judgment	of	the	Court	10	December	1968,	ECR	423.		
61 According	to	the	ECJ,	the	Italian	Republic	failed	to	fulfil	the	obligations	imposed	on	it	by	Article	16	of	the	EEC	Treaty	by	continuing	to	levy,	after	1	January	1962,	the	progressive	tax	provided	for	by	the	Italian	Law	no.	1089	of	1	January	1939,	on	exports	to	other	Member	States	of	objects	of	artistic,	historic,	archaeological	or	ethnographic	interest.	62	In	the	same	sense:	Andrea	Biondi,	The	Merchant,	the	Thief	&	the	Citizen:	The	Circulation	of	Works	of	Art	Within	
the	European	Union,	Common	Market	Law	Review	34,	no.	5	(1997):	1173	–	1195,	at	1181.	
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in	 1992	 upholds	 similar	 arguments.63	 It	 seems	we	 should	 test	 this	 interpretation,	which	 is	competing	 with	 other	 interpretations64	 –	 under	 what	 circumstances	 today	 will	 a	 Member	State’s	 national	 interest	 in	 keeping	 cultural	 goods	 on	 its	 own	 territory	 be	 treated	 as	 an	obstacle	to	free	trade	in	the	Eurozone?		The	 fundamental	 issue	 concerns	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 notions	 of	 “cultural	heritage”,	 	a	liminal	concept65	that	is	relevant	to	several	non-legal	disciplines	as	well,	and	of	“national	treasure”.66			
7. National	Treasure	in	Directive	2014/60	and	its	Implementation	
	Although	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 include	 only	 the	most	 important	 elements	 of	 cultural	 heritage	within	 the	 scope	 of	 application	 of	 Directive	 2014/60,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 what	 the	 dynamic	components	 of	 a	 “national	 treasure”	 are,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 circulation	 of	 those	objects	which	comprise	a	State’s	“cultural	heritage”.	Article	 2(1)	 of	 Directive	 2014/60	 defines	 a	 “cultural	 object”	 as	 any	 object	 that	 is	classified	 or	 defined	 by	 a	 Member	 State,	 before	 or	 after	 its	 unlawful	 removal	 from	 the	territory	of	 that	Member	 State,	 as	 a	 “national	 treasure	 of	 artistic,	 historic	or	 archaeological	value”	under	national	legislation	or	administrative	procedures	within	the	meaning	of	Article	
                                                             63	Communication	on	the	protection	of	national	treasures	with	an	artistic	historical	or	archaeological	value	in	the	context	of	the	removal	of	internal	borders	in	1992,	COM	(89)	594	final,	at	para.	5:	“It	is	for	each	Member	State	to	determine	 its	 own	 criteria	 for	 identifying	 cultural	 objects	 that	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 «national	 treasures»;	nevertheless,	the	concept	of	«national	treasures	possessing	artistic,	historic	or	archaeological	value»	cannot	be	defined	unilaterally	by	the	Member	States	without	verification	by	the	Community	institutions…	Moreover,	Article	36	of	the	EEC	Treaty	–	which	should	be	interpreted	restrictively	since	it	derogates	from	the	fundamental	rules	of	the	 free	 movement	 of	 goods	 –	 cannot	 be	 relied	 upon	 to	 justify	 laws,	 procedures	 or	 practices	 that	 lead	 to	discrimination	or	restrictions	which	are	disproportionate	with	respect	to	the	aim	in	view.”.	64	 	On	the	various	interpretations	advanced	with	respect	to	the	question:	Irini	A.	Stamatoudi,	Cultural	Property	
Law	 and	 Restitution:	 A	 Commentary	 to	 International	 Conventions	 and	 European	 Union	 Law,	Cheltenham,	UK	and	Northampton,	MA,	USA:	Edward	Elgar,	2011,	122	ff.	65	Massimo	S.	Giannini,	I	beni	culturali,	Riv.	trim.	dir.	pub	26	(1976):	3-38	and	Lorenzo	Casini,	Ereditare	il	futuro…	cit.	note	14.	Francesco	Francioni,	A	Dynamic	Evolution	of	Concept	and	Scope:	From	Cultural	Property	to	Cultural	
Heritage,	 in	 Normative	 Action	 in	 Education,	 Science	 and	 Culture	 edited	 by	 Abdulqawi	 A.	 Yusuf,	UNESCO	Publishing:	Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers,	2007,	pp.	221-236.	66	As	discussed	below,	the	expression	“national	treasure”	featuring	in	Article	36	TUEF	is	a	token	for	a	concept	that	is	not	necessarily	uniform,	under	the	various	language	versions	of	the	Treaty.	
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36	 TFEU.	 This	 strengthens	 the	 protection	 of	 Member	 States’	 national	 treasures,	 as	 does	Regulation	116/2009.67			Unfortunately,	however,	the	choice	of	“national	treasure”	as	the	key	expression	in	the	Directive	is	of	little	direct	assistance	in	the	context	of	restitution	of	cultural	property	between	Member	States.	This	is	because	the	definition	is	likely	to	vary	from	State	to	State;	indeed	it	has	not	been	possible	to	achieve	any	sense	of	harmony	among	the	different	national	laws.68		The	European	Commission’s	previous	Reports,	presented	every	 three	years	 from	 the	entry	 into	 force	 of	 Directive	 93/7,	 reflected	 a	 range	 of	 factors	 that	 resulted	 in	 the	ineffectiveness	of	that	Directive.	Amongst	the	most	important	were	the	requirements	making	it	 essential	 to	 classify	 objects	 as	 an	 element	 of	 national	 culture	 through	 a	 formal	 return	procedure,	i.e.	they	had	to	belong	to	one	of	the	categories	listed	in	the	Annex	to	the	Directive	as	well	as	to	fulfil	certain	criteria	relating	to	the	value	and	age	of	the	protected	cultural	object.		Directive	2014/60,	and	its	reception	and	application	so	far	within	EU	Member	States,	does	not	really	improve	on	the	status	quo.	Here	we	can	tackle	at	least	three	issues.	The	first	has	 to	do	with	path	dependence,	which	 is	related	 to	 the	appropriateness	of	 considering	 the	previous	 Annex	 to	 Directive	 93/769	 as	 a	 reference	 point	 to	 fill	 in	 the	 notion	 of	 “national	treasure”.	 Indeed,	 some	Member	 States	 still	make	 use	 of	 the	 reference	 to	 public	 collections	listed	in	the	inventories	of	museums,	archives	or	libraries’	conservation	collection,	and	to	the	inventories	 of	 ecclesiastical	 institutions,	 plus	 to	 financial	 or	 historical	 thresholds.70	 For	example,	the	Polish	Act	on	the	Protection	and	Guardianship	of	Monuments	(APGM)71	contains	
                                                             67	According	to	its	7th	Whereas,	the	Regulation	is	not	intended	to	prejudice	the	definition	of	“national	treasure”	adopted	by	Member	States.	68	Jia	Min	Cheng,	The	Problem	of	National	Treasure	in	International	Law,	Oregon	Review	of	International	Law	12,	no.	1	(2010):	141	–	174.	69	The	Annex	listed,	inter	alia,	the	following	categories:	a.	elements	forming	an	integral	part	of	artistic,	historical	or	 religious	 monuments	 which	 have	 been	 dismembered	 and	 are	 more	 than	 100	 years	 old;	 b.	 pictures	 and	pairings….	 executed	entirely	 by	 hand,	 or	any	material	 and	 in	 any	medium..;	 c.	mosaics….	 other	 than	 falling	 in	categories	 a.	 and	 b.	 and	drawings	 executed	 entirely	 by	 hand	 on	 any	medium	and	 in	 any	material;	 d.	 original	engravings,	prints,	serigraphs	and	lithographs	with	their	respective	posters	and	plates;	e.	original	sculptures	or	statuary	and	copies	produced	by	the	same	process	as	the	original.	70	The	object	must	be	more	than	50	years	old	(with	some	exceptions	for	certain	collections),	not	belong	to	its	creator,	 and	 have	 a	 minimum	 value	 of	 between	 “whatever	 the	 value”	 (for	 archaeological	 objects	 archives,	incunabula	and	manuscripts)	and	“150,000	Euro”	(for	pictures).	The	works	of	 living	artists	are	excluded,	since	contemporary	art	is	not	consistent	with	the	historical	threshold,	i.e.	being	more	than	50	years	old.	See	Barbara	T.	Hoffman,	European	Union	Legislation	Pertaining	to	Cultural	Goods,	in	Art	and	Cultural	Heritage,	edited	by	Barbara	Hoffman,	New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006,	pp.	191	-	194.	71	Ustawa	z	dnia	23	lipca	2003	r.	o	ochronie	zabytków	i	opiece	nad	zabytkami	(as	modified	in	2014),	available	at	http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20031621568	[accessed	on	21.08.2017].	
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a	list	that	is	a	verbatim	copy	of	the	Annex	to	Directive	93/7:	the	cultural	objects	which	can	be	classified	 as	 the	 Heritage	 Treasures	 List	 (Lista	 Skarbów	 Dziedzictwa)	 are	 those	 of	 utmost	importance	for	the	Polish	cultural	heritage.	In	fact	this	list	was	proposed	in	2014	as	a	special	tool	to	protect	the	most	important	cultural	objects	of	Poland’s	national	heritage,	in	particular	the	Lady	with	an	Ermine,	1489-90	-	a	painting	owned	until	2016	by	the	Princes	Czartoryski	Foundation,	a	private	charity.	Popular	gossip	circulates	that	the	main	reason	for	the	list	was	the	government’s	intention	to	limit	international	loans	of	the	only	Leonardo	da	Vinci	painting	in	Poland.	In	fact,	the	entire	art	collection	of	the	Foundation	has	recently	been	purchased	by	the	Polish	State	to	secure	its	display	in	the	country.	 	What	the	lawmaker	really	had	in	mind,	according	 to	 some	 domestic	 commentators,	 was	 a	 very	 strong	 control	 over	 “national	treasures”,	while	transferring	the	duty	of	care	from	the	State	to	individual	owners.72	Thus	the	Polish	provisions	still	impose	restrictions	on	return	based	on	the	categories	of	objects	defined	by	their	nature,	age	and	market	value,	as	was	the	case	in	Directive	93/7.73		A	 second	 issue,	 which	 is	 only	 briefly	 sketched	 here,	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	 fact	 that	“national	treasure”	is	not	a	stand-alone	concept.	The	good	faith	purchaser,	for	example,	is	still	treated	 in	a	different	way	under	different	national	 legal	 systems,74	notwithstanding	 the	 fact	that	 the	 1995	 UNIDROIT	 Convention	 provides	 a	 pragmatic	 uniform	 solution	 for	 assessing	whether	the	possessor	had	been	diligent,	which	was	adopted	in	Directive	2014/60.75		A	 third	 issue	 concerns	 the	 domestic	 interpretations	 of	 “national	 treasure”,	 having	regard	 to	 the	different	official	 language	versions	of	 the	Directive	2014/60	and	of	Article	36	
                                                             72	 Piotr	 Stec,	 The	 Lady	 or	 the	 Tiger?	 Legal	 Pitfalls	 of	 Implementing	 the	 Return	 of	 Cultural	 Goods	 Directive,	
Santander	Art	and	Culture	Law	Review	2,	no.	2	(2016):	135-144,	at	135.	73	Wojciech	W.	Kowalski,	Ratification	of	the	1995	UNIDROIT	Convention	on	Stolen	or	 Illegally	Exported	Cultural	
Objects,	in	Light	of	Directive	2014/60/UE	on	the	Return	of	Cultural	Objects	Unlawfully	Removed	from	the	Territory	
of	a	Member	State:	The	Perspective	of	Poland,	Santander	Art	and	Culture	Law	Review	2,	no.	2	(2016):	165-178,	at	170.	74	Marta	Cenini,	Gli	acquisti	a	non	domino,	Milano:	Giuffrè	2009,	at	21.	75	Manlio	 Frigo,	The	 Impact	 of	 the	UNIDROIT	 Convention	 on	 International	 case	 law	and	 practice.	 An	Appraisal,	
Uniform	Law	Review	20	no	4	(2015):	626-636;	Cornu,	cit.	note	52.	In	this	regard	it	is	inevitable	that	note	will	be	taken	 of	 the	many	 comparative	 law	 contributions	 to	 the	 preparation	 and	 interpretation	 of	 international	 and	European	rules	on	this	matter.	We	can	recall,	for	example,	that	the	1995	UNIDROIT	Convention	originated	from	a	previous	proposal	to	establish	a	uniform	regime	for	the	good	faith	purchaser	(an	innocent	party	who	purchases	for	value	a	property	without	notice	of	any	other	party’s	claim	to	the	title	of	that	property)	against	the	nemo	plus	
iuris	rule	(ad	alium	transferre	potest	quam	ipse	habet),	which	means	that	one	cannot	transfer	more	rights	than	(s)he	has,	i.e.	a	purchase	from	someone	who	has	no	ownership	rights	denies	the	purchaser	any	ownership	title	to	the	property.	
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TFEU.76	 The	 expression	 “national	 treasure”	 has	 been	 translated	 differently	 in	 the	 various	authentic	language	versions.	For	example,	the	English	and	French	versions	refer	to	treasure,	“trésor	 nationaux”,	 while	 Italian,	 Spanish	 and	 Portuguese	 texts	 appear	 to	 give	 the	 State	 a	broader	discretionary	power	to	protect	the	patrimony/heritage,	“patrimonio	artistico,	storico	
o	 archeologico	 nazionale”.	 It	 therefore	 seems	 that	 Italian,	 Spanish	 and	 Portuguese	 versions	vest	more	power	in	the	Member	States	as	exporting	countries,	who	would	thus	prefer	a	more	extensive	interpretation	of	what	is	their	“national	treasure”.	In	contrast,	importing	countries	favour	 a	 restrictive	 interpretation	 of	 the	 notion	 that	 has	 been	 tagged	 as	 “elitist”77	 exactly	because	it	contains	the	idea	of	a	restriction	to	the	greatest	elements	of	the	cultural	heritage	of	the	 States.	 But	 beyond	 this	 somewhat	 vague	 and	 formalistic	 distinction	 between	 exporting	and	 importing	 countries,	 we	 can	 notice	 a	 general	 trend	 to	 adopt	 a	 wide	 and	 protectionist	definition	of	what	 is	a	national	 treasure	or	national	artistic	heritage.	Viewed	 in	this	 light	we	can	underscore	that	the	Polish	National	Treasures	Act	(NTA	Article	2	point	4)	implementing	Directive	 2014/6078	 adopts	 a	 very	 wide	 definition	 of	 “national	 treasure”,	 comprising	practically	all	cultural	objects,	 including	archives	and	 library	materials	classified	as	National	Library	deposits	and	objects	 in	museum	inventories,	even	 if	 they	are	not	“heritage	 items”.79	The	new	German	Cultural	Property	Protection	Act	(CPPA)80	implementing	Directive	2014/60	adopts	 an	 extended	 notion	 of	 “Nationales	 Kulturgut”	 (national	 cultural	 good),	 which	comprises	public	collections	as	well	as	objects	of	churches	and	religious	entities.	Furthermore,	any	 cultural	 object	 designated	 as	 a	 “valuable	 cultural	 good”	 (valuable	 to	 German	 cultural	heritage	and/or	because	its	transfer	out	of	Germany	is	considered	as	a	loss)	can	be	registered	
                                                             76	See,	among	others,	Kurt	Siehr,	The	Protection	of	Cultural	Heritage	and	International	Commerce,	International	
Journal	of	Cultural	Property	6	no	2	(1997):	304	-326;	Lorna	Woods,	Free	movement	of	Goods	and	services	within	
the	 European	 Community,	 Farnham:	 Ashgate,	 2004;	 Manlio	 Frigo,	 La	 circolazione	 internazionale	 dei	 beni	
culturali…	cit	note	14,	at,	71-74;	Id.,	Circulation	des	biens	culturels,	cit	note	1,	at	305	ff.	The	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	Treaties	provides	a	general	rule	of	interpretation,	which	confirms	that	exceptions	in	Treaties	must	be	strictly	construed.	77		Cornu,	cit	note	52,	at	643.	78	 Ustawa	 z	 dnia	 25	 maja	 2017	 r.	 o	 restytucji	 narodowych	 dóbr	 kultury	 available	 at	http://www.dziennikustaw.gov.pl/du/2017/1086/1	[accessed	on	21.08.2017].	79	Cf	Piotr	Stec	and	Wojciech	W.	Kowalski,	cit.	above.	80	Gesetz	 zur	 Neuregelung	 des	 Kulturgutschutzrechts	 –	 KGSG	 [Act	 of	 31	 July	 2016	 Reforming	 the	 Law	 on	 the	Protection	 of	 Cultural	 Property],	 Bundesgesetzblatt	 (BGBl.)	 2016	 I	 S.	 1914,	 http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/kgsg/index.htm	[accessed	on	21.05.2017].	The	CPPA	is	comprised	of	paragraphs	instead	of	articles,	because	it	 is	 in	itself	Article	1	of	the	overall	 legislative	reform.	See	Paul	Fabel,	Due	Diligence	Obligations	 in	the	
New	German	Cultural	Property	Protection	Act,	Santander	Art	and	Culture	Law	Review	2,	no.	2	(2016):	237-246.	See	also	the	article	by	Peters,	cit	note	35.	
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and	receive	the	same	protection.	The	Italian	Legislative	Decree	No.	2	of	7	January	2016,81	also	implementing	Directive	2014/60,	amends	the	related	provisions	under	the	2004	Italian	Code	of	Cultural	and	Landscape	Heritage,	which	covers	the	international	circulation,	and	restitution	or	 return,	 of	 stolen	 or	 illegally	 exported	 objects.82	 The	 new	 definition	 of	 “beni	 culturali”	(cultural	 objects)	 also	 includes	 cultural	 objects	 that	 are	 “merely	 defined”	 as	 such.83	 This	change,	and	the	abolition	of	the	list	of	categories	contained	in	the	Annex	to	the	Directive,	has	considerably	 extended	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 relevant	 legal	 regime.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 under	 the	Italian	 legislation	 requests	 can	 be	 submitted	 for	 the	 return	 of	 items	 of	 paleontological,	numismatic,	and	items	of	scientific	interest,	even	if	they	do	not	belong	to	collections	listed	in	inventories	 of	museums,	 archives,	 libraries,	 or	 ecclesiastical	 institutions.84	 France,	which	 in	February	 2015	 was	 the	 first	 State	 to	 implement	 Directive	 2014/60,	 applied	 the	 relevant	definition	 provided	 in	 its	 Code	 du	 patrimoine	 to	 designate	 “trésors	 nationaux	”.85	 This	definition	is	a	very	broad	one,	as	Article	111(1)	Code	du	patrimoine	provides	that,	in	addition	to	the	categories	of	“cultural	objects”	such	as	collections	of	museums,	archives,	etc.,	which	are	specified	in	detail,	the	definition	also	includes	“other	goods	of	a	significant	importance	for	the	cultural	heritage	from	the	point	of	view	of	history,	art	or	archaeology”,	all	of	which	in	practice	will	be	determined	by	the	relevant	administrative	authorities.		As	pointed	out	in	the	literature	on	the	topic,	EU	Member	States	have	thus	obtained	an	“almost	unlimited	 freedom	 to	define	what	 is	 and	what	 is	not	a	 cultural	object	which	 can	be	classified	 as	 a	 national	 treasure”.86	 Incidentally,	 the	 Austrian	 Federal	 Act	 on	 the	 return	 of	unlawfully	 removed	 cultural	 objects	 adopted,	 for	 example,	 two	 separate	 definitions	 of	 a	cultural	object:87	the	first	refers	to	Article	2	point	1	of	Directive	2014/60	and	provides	that	a	
                                                             81	 Attuazione	 della	 direttiva	 2014/60/UE	 relative	 alla	 restituzione	 dei	 beni	 culturali	 usciti	 illecitamente	 dal	
territorio	 di	 uno	 Stato	membro	 e	 che	modifica	 il	 regolamento	 (UE)	 n.	 1024/2012	 [Legislative	 Decree,	No.	 2,	 7	January	 2016]	 Gazzetta	 Ufficiale,	 No.	 7,	 11.02.2016,	 available	 at	http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2016/01/11/16G00003/sg	 [accessed	 on	 21.08.2017].	 See	 Frigo,	 The	
Implementation	of	Directive	2014/60/EU	...	cit	note	16.	82	Codice	 dei	 beni	 culturali	 e	 del	 paesaggio	 (consolidated	version),	 http://www.altalex.com/documents/codici-altalex/2014/11/20/codice-dei-beni-culturali-e-del-paesaggio	[accessed	on	25.6.2017].		83	Under	the	former	Directive,	the	cultural	object	had	to	be	classified	as	such	by	the	Member	State.	84	Frigo	cit.	note	16.	85	 Code	 du	 patrimoine	 (consolidated	 version),	 https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=-LEGITEXT000006074236	[accessed	on	25.6.2017].		86	Stec,	cit	note	72,	at	112.	87	Bernard	Łukańko,	The	Implementation	Process	of	Directive	2014/60/EU	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	
Council	 in	Austrian	Legislation,	Santander	Art	and	Culture	Law	Review	2,	no.	2	(2016):119-134,	at	123.	See	the	
	22	
 
cultural	object	 is	 an	object	which	under	 the	 law	of	 an	EU	Member	State,	before	or	after	 its	unlawful	 removal	 from	 the	 territory	 of	 that	 Member	 State,	 was	 classified	 or	 defined	 as	 a	“national	treasure”	within	the	meaning	of	Article	36	TFEU;	while	at	the	same	time	a	cultural	object	is	an	object	that	is	protected	under	the	provisions	of	a	State	party	to	the	1970	UNESCO	Convention	as	part	of	the	“nation’s	cultural	heritage”,	within	the	meaning	of	Articles	1,	4	and	5	of	this	Convention.	It	remains	to	be	seen	what	the	Austrian	interpreters	will	do	with	these	two	distinct	reference	definitions.	In	conclusion,	the	provisions	of	both	the	EU	Treaty	and	Directive	2014/60	allow	for	a	potentially	creative	and	wide	protection	of	cultural	heritage	at	the	national	level.		
8. National	Treasure	and	its	link	to	“Culture”			The	 above-mentioned	 exceptions	 to	 free	 trade,	 encapsulated	 into	 the	 expression	 “national	treasure”	 respectively	 in	Article	XX(f)	WTO	and	Article	36	TFEU,	avoid	any	 reference	 to	 the	word	“culture”,	that	is	to	the	“cultural	value”	the	objects	should	have	in	order	to	be	protected,	while	Directive	2014/60,	in	classifying	a	good	as	part	of	a	“national	treasure”,	used	the	term	“cultural”	to	mean	an	object	with	artistic,	historic	or	archaeological	value.		The	first	issue	therefore	concerns	the	“cultural	object”	defined	by	Directive	2014/60	in	relation	 to	 “national	 treasure”,	 as	 just	 discussed	 above.	 In	 the	 mainstream	 literature,	 it	 is	emphasized	that	the	“national	treasure”	designation	does	not	refer	to	all	cultural	objects,	but	only	to	those	that	have	an	inseparable	link	to	the	culture	and	history	of	a	given	country.88		As	a	consequence,	a	second	relevant	issue	is	raised	in	relation	to	the	terms	and	expressions	used	to	qualify	 the	 content	 of	 the	 term	 “national	 treasure”,	 which	 include	 such	 vague	 notions	 as	”culture”,	 “history”,	 “artistic	values”,	 “age	value”,	 “use	value”	 89	 etc.,90	 and	which	are	 in	 turn	eventually	interpreted	as	flexible	guidelines	by	the	domestic	Courts	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	
                                                                                                                                                                                                          unofficial	 English	 translation	 of	 the	 Act	 at	 http://www.kunstkultur.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=65851	[accessed	on	26.6.2017].		88	Biondi,	The	Merchant,	the	Thief	and	the	Citizen…,	cit.	note	62,	1173	ff.	89	The	market	value	of	these	objects	fluctuates	a	lot,	depending	on	the	social	setting	in	which	they	circulate:	see	David	Throsby,	The	Economics	of	Cultural	Policy,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2010.	Hence	market	value	is	a	relevant	aspect,	but	not	essential	for	the	above-mentioned	test.	90	Each	notion	has	been	discussed	by	Alois	Riegl,	The	Modern	Cult	of	Monuments:	Its	Essence	and	Its	Development,	in	Historical	and	Philosophical	Issues	 in	the	Conservation	of	Cultural	History	edited	by	Nicholas	Stanley	Price,	M.	Kirby	Talley	Jr.	and	Alessandra	Melucco	Vaccaro,	Los	Angeles:	Getty	Conservation	Institute,	1996,	pp.	69-83.	
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If	we	 look	 at	 the	words	 chosen	 by	 the	 European	 lawmaker	we	 can	 speculate	 on	 the	message	 that	 the	EU	 intended	 to	 communicate	using	precisely	 those	words	and	not	others:	“treasure”	evokes	an	object	of	extraordinary	economic	value,	anchored	to	a	monetary	index.	It	furthermore	 recalls	 the	 idea	 of	 an	 accidental,	 fortuitous	 finder	 who	 finds	 something	abandoned,	hidden	or	buried,	about	which	no	one	can	prove	(s)he	is	the	owner.91	“Treasure”	is,	 then,	 first	 of	 all	 a	 national	 property	 law	 issue,	 which	 also	 eventually	 became	 an	international	 trade	 issue.	 A	 property	 right	 is	 the	 right	 to	 possess,	 use,	 and	 enjoy	 a	 specific	piece	of	property	(whether	a	chattel	or	land),	i.e.	a	right	of	ownership.	The	owner	has	the	right	to	 determine	 how	 to	 use	 the	 property,	 for	 example	whether	 to	 sell	 or	 rent	 it.	 The	 law	 can	subordinate	this	right	to	the	general	social	interest	(reasons	of	public	utility),	according	to	the	forms	established	by	law	and	upon	the	payment	of	just	compensation.	This	is	a	fundamental	right	 recognized	 all	 over	 the	world	 –	 at	 the	 international	 level	 (International	 Covenant	 on	Economic,	 Social	 and	 Cultural	 Rights	(ICESCR)	1966,	 Article	 1);	 at	 the	 regional	 level	(European	 Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights,	 Article	 1	 Protocol	 1;	 American	 Convention	 on	Human	Rights,	Article	21;	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	of	the	European	Union,	Article	17),	and	in	national	Constitutions.	The	fact	that	“treasure”	is	a	property	law	issue	is	well	illustrated	in	 the	 famous	 Barakat	 case	 in	 2007,92	 when	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 for	 England	 and	 Wales	applied	the	 lex	rei	 sitae	 connecting	 factor	and	stated	that:	 “The	claim	is	an	attempt	to	assert	rights	of	ownership,	not	to	enforce	export	restrictions”,	and	ordered	the	restitution	to	Iran	of	18	 carved	 jars,	 bowls	 and	 cups	dating	 from	 the	 period	3000	BC	 and	 originating	 from	 illicit	excavations	in	the	Jiroft	region	of	Iran.		“National”,	on	the	other	hand,	can	refer	to	where	the	treasure	was	found,	or	to	where	the	work	of	art,	the	object,	was	created,	or	to	the	nationality	of	the	creator,	or	the	place	it	represents,	or	to	which	it	refers.		
                                                             91	See,	for	example,	the	Italian	Civil	Code,	Article	932,	in	Mara	Wantuch-Thole,	Cultural	Property	in	Cross-Border	
Litigation:	 Turning	 Rights	 into	 Claims,	 Berlin:	 De	 Gruyter	 2015,	 at	 31,	 and	 compare	 it	 with	 the	 common	 law	approach	to	the	law	of	finders	in	Craig	Forrest,	International	Law	and	…,	cit	note	1,	at	307-308.	The	law	of	finds	is	applied	to	historic	shipwreck	together	with	the	law	of	salvage:	see	Christian	Hoefly,	National	Treasure:	a	Survey	
of	the	Current	International	Law	Regime	for	Underwater	Cultural	Heritage,	Penn.	St.	J.L.	&	Int'l	Aff.	no.	4:2	(2016):	814	-	839.	92	Government	of	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran	v.	The	Barakat	Galleries	Ltd	[2007]	EWCA	Civ	1374	(CA),	[2009]	QB	22.	Comments	by	Frigo	(2015),	cit	supra	note	75;	Nafziger	(2016)	cit.	supra	note	8,	at	191.	The	judgment	had	two	corollaries:	a)	the	right	of	ownership	under	Iranian	law	has	the	same	effect	as	under	English	law;	b)	the	1970	UNESCO	Convention,	Directive	93/7,	and	the	1995	UNIDROIT	Convention	had	a	deep	influence	on	English	law,	even	though	the	UK	is	not	a	party	to	the	latter	Convention.	
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In	putting	together	the	two	terms	“national	+	treasure”	to	form	the	concept	of	national	treasure(s),	 the	 ordinary	 meaning	 of	 the	 two	 words	 seems	 to	 deviate	 and	 the	 expression	acquires	a	new	and	different	 sense.	A	national	 treasure	 is	 a	property	belonging	to	a	 certain	State,	regardless	of	whether	the	constitutive	elements	of	this	property	were	created	by	one	of	its	nationals,	or	within	its	territory,	or	were	inspired	by	a	subject	related	to	that	State,	i.e.	This	leads	to	conclude	that	the	search	for	connecting	factors	to	its	“national	culture”	is	sometimes	vain.	This	 is	a	 functional	 transformation	of	sense	with	respect	 to	 the	 ideal	notion	that	 these	special	objects	belong	to	the	nation,	and	not	being	of	anyone	in	particular,	belong	in	fact	to	all,	an	ideal	which	prevailed	in	States	like	France	(soon	followed	by	many	others),	and	that	was	fundamental	to	ground	the	State’s	protection	of	the	national	heritage.93	Despite	the	fact	that	States	are	engaged	in	the	protection	of	national	cultural	goods,	artworks	in	public	hands	are	not	 always	 adequately	 kept:	 a	 child	 vomited	 over	 some	 bronze	 tiles	 forming	 part	 of	 Carl	Andre’s	 Venus	 Forge	 at	 the	 Tate	 Museum	 in	 London;	 someone	 kissed	 a	 painting	 by	 Cy	Twombly	at	the	Museum	of	Contemporary	Art	in	Avignon,	smearing	lipstick	onto	the	canvas;	while	Munch’s	The	Scream	was	stolen	twice	from	the	National	Gallery	in	Oslo	(the	thieves	left	a	 note	 reading	 “Thanks	 for	 the	 poor	 security”).	 In	 some	 cases	 States	 also	 banned	 the	exposition	of	some	artworks,	 and	 imprisoned	artists	 for	pornography	and	 immorality,	 as	 in	the	case	of	Egon	Schiele.94	Even	when	a	national	treasure	is	owned	by	private	collectors,	who	can	 afford	 the	market	 price	 of	 such	works	 of	 art,95	 the	 protection	 is	 not	 guaranteed.	 Some	
                                                             93	During	the	tumultuous	years	of	the	French	Revolution	the	Abbé	Grégoire	celebrated	freedom	but,	at	the	same	time,	eloquently	argued	that	that	patriotism	could	not	affirm	itself	by	destroying	monuments	and	artifacts	that	represented	the	legacy	of	the	past:	Abbe	Grégoire	suggested	the	recognition	and	protection	of	those	objects	that	“incorporate	the	genius	of	past	generations,	which	serve	as	incentive	for	creativity	and	talent	development	for	future	generations”.	On	similar	premises,	many	objects	 formerly	belonging	 to	 the	nobility	or	 the	Church	were	incorporated	 into	 the	 State	 treasure	 (patrimoine),	 or	 were	 subject	 to	 public	 constraints.	 André	 Chastel,	
Patrimoine,	Encyclopédia	Universalis,	Supplément,	Paris,	1980;	Jean-Pierre	Babelon,	André	Chastel,	La	notion	de	
patrimoine,	 Paris:	 Éditions	 Liana	 Levi,	 1994;	 Victor	 Hugo,	Pamphlets	 pour	 la	 sauvegarde,	 Guerre	 aux	
démolisseurs	!,	Apt:	L’Archange	Minotaure	ed.,	 2006.	For	more	 on	 the	 evolution	 of	 French	 law,	 see	 the	essays	collected	 in	 the	volume	by	Maria	Luisa	Catoni,(ed.),	 Il	patrimonio	culturale	 in	Francia,	Milano:	Electa,	2007,	as	well	 as	 Joseph	M.	 Sax,	Heritage	 Preservation	 as	 a	 Public	 Duty:	 The	 Abbé	 Gregoire	 and	 the	 Origins	 of	 an	 Idea,	
Michigan	Law	Review	88	(1990):	1142	-	1169.	94	 Cf	La	 storia	 dell’arte,	 La	Biblioteca	 di	 Repubblica,	 Electa:	Milano,	 2006	 and	 Scoprire	 l’arte,	 La	 Biblioteca	 di	Repubblica,	Giunti:	Firenze,	2017.	95	Cf	the	Yves	Saint	Laurent	private	collection:	Christie’s	auctioned	off	works	from	this	collection	for	more	than	264	million	Dollars	in	February	2009	(Steven	Erlanger,	Saint	Laurent	Art	Sale	Brings..,	New	York	Times,	Febr.	23,	2009,	 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/arts/design/24auction.html?mcubz=1.);	 Bill	 Gates	 acquired	 the	Leonardo	Codex	Leicester	in	1994	for	31	million	Dollars	(Carol	Vogel,	Leonardo	Notebook	sells..	New	York	Times,	November	 12,	 1994,	 http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/12/us/leonardo-notebook-sells-for-30.8-million.html?mcubz=1.		
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commentators	 have	 already	 described	 what	 private	 owners	 of	 art	 objects	 have	 done	 with	their	 valuable	 possessions:96	 we	 can	 just	 mention	 here	 Groult,	 the	 19th	 century	 French	collector	 who	 wanted	 to	 burn	 his	 collection	 before	 he	 died;	 Ryoei	 Saito,	 the	 Japanese	businessman	 who	 bought	 Renoir’s	 Au	 Mulin	 de	 la	 Galette	 and	 van	 Gogh’s	 Portrait	 of	 Dr.	Gachet	 at	 auction	 and	 said	 he	 wanted	 the	 works	 to	 be	 cremated	 with	 him;	 or,	 as	 other	examples,	 the	 works	 by	 van	 Eyck	 and	 Pollock,	 which	 were	 cut	 into	 fragments	 and	 sold	separately	 to	 increase	 their	 economic	 value	 (a	 well-known	 ancient	 praxis	 applied	 to	incunabula	and	books).		A	provocative	question	could	then	be:	should	national	treasures	and	cultural	goods	in	general	belong	to	those	who	can	afford	the	costs	for	their	protection,	without	denying	citizens	access	 to	enjoyment	of	 them?	Historically,	works	of	 art	 and	archaeological	objects	 followed	military	 and	 economic	 power.	 Western	 States	 thus	 accumulated	 these	 objects	 around	 the	world.	However,	since	the	beginning	of	romanticism,	the	prevailing	idea	in	many	quarters	is	that	 cultural	 goods	 are	 connected	 to	 people	 and	 places,	 and	 that	 their	 physical	 location	 is	intertwined	with	their	aesthetic	 force	and	social	significance.	Some	questions	surface	 in	 this	respect:	Are	States	of	origin	able	 to	afford	 the	price	 to	bring	back	objects	already	 lost?	Are	they	willing	to	pay	for	their	citizens’	enjoyment	of	heritage	resources?	Can	national	heritage	be	 understood	 to	 exclude	 those	 objects	 that	 where	 not	 produced	 locally,	 but	 have	 been	acquired	from	other	nations?	To	escape	these	embarrassing	questions,	resorting	to	the	notion	of	“cultural	heritage”	is	of	little	help.				
9. Is	there	a	“European	Cultural	Heritage”	to	protect?		The	 legal	 literature	 reflects	 a	 clear	 divide	 between	 those	 States	 that	 promote	 a	 vision	 of	objects	as	inscribed	in	a	given	culture,	and	those	that	believe	instead	that	such	goods	should	be	subject	to	protective	regimes	modelled	according	to	worldwide	uniform	schemes,	because	they	reflect	universal	values	protecting	“culture”	as	a	human	right.	John	Merryman,	a	strong	advocate	 of	 the	 latter	 vision,	which	 is	 also	 supported	 by	 a	 number	 of	 important	museums,	
                                                             96	 Joseph	 L.	 Sax,	Playing	 Darts	with	 a	 Rembrandt:	 Public	 and	 Private	 Rights	 in	 Cultural	 Treasures,	 Ann	 Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	1999.	Cf.	also	La	storia	dell’arte,	and	Scoprire	l’arte,	cit.	note	94.	
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described	 this	 dichotomy	 using	 two	 categories:	 cultural	 nationalists	 and	 cultural	
internationalists.97	 This	 is	 not	 merely	 one	 of	 many	 academic	 disputes.	 Salvatore	 Settis,	Emeritus	 Professor	 of	 History	 of	 Classical	 Art	 and	 Archaeology	 at	 the	 Scuola	 Normale	
Superiore	of	Pisa	and	a	member	on	many	museums’	Advisory	Boards,98	eloquently	explained	the	reasons	why	the	two	positions	represent	the	opposite	poles	of	the	conventional	discourse	on	culture,	and	vigorously	recalls	 the	short-and	 long-term	risks	arising	 from	our	 inability	 to	imagine	culture	as	a	fluctuating	notion,	as	a	living	social	and	urban	fabric	(“tessuto	urbano	e	
sociale	vivente”)	according	to	the	Italian	tradition	developed	throughout	its	history.99	It	 is	 certainly	 true	 that	 defence	 of	 the	 integrity	 of	 a	 certain	 culture	 is	 typically	 the	responsibility	of	a	State,	based	on	the	default	principle	of	uti	possidetis.100	It	is	also	true	that	the	uti	 possidetis	 principle	 can	 give	 some	 positive	 results	 if	we	 assume	 that	 cultural	 goods	reflect	“universal”	cultural	values.	But	the	arguments	against	the	assumptions	underlying	the	positions	taken	by	Merryman	and	others,	are	rather	solid,	as	explained	by	Neil	Brodie.	Brodie	rejects	 the	 internationalists’	 argument	 that	 the	 protection	 of	 cultural	 heritage	 through	restrictive	 measures	 would	 only	 encourage	 the	 illicit	 trafficking	 in	 cultural	 goods.101	Furthermore	the	position	taken	by	Merryman	is	reductive	at	any	rate,	because	in	addition	to	
cultural	 internationalists	 and	 cultural	 nationalists	 there	 are	 also	 cultural	 intra-nationalists:	significant	claims	on	cultural	heritage	can	originate	from	indigenous	peoples	who	live	within	and	 across	 the	 borders	 of	 different	 nations,	 or	 from	 small	 local	 communities	who	 are	 the	custodians	of	 cultural	 goods	 by	 chance,	 and	 could	 also	 originate	 from	migrants	 in	 the	 near	future.	Cultural	heritage	 is,	 indeed,	a	vast	domain	not	entirely	represented	by	the	totality	of	tangible	cultural	objects:	it	includes	oral	traditions,	patronymics,	choreographies,	rituals	and	ceremonies,	 social	 practices	 and	 festive	 events,	 landscape,	 cultural	 spaces	 created	 by	
                                                             97	 John	H.	Merryman,	Two	Ways	of	Thinking	About	Cultural	Property,	American	Journal	of	International	Law	80,	(1986):	831	 -	853;	now	 in	Thinking	About	the	Elgin	Marbles.	Critical	Essays	on	Cultural	Property,	Art	and	Law,	edited	by	John	H.	Merryman,	Alphen	aan	den	Rijn:	Wolters	Kluwer	Law	&	Business	Revised	ed.,	2009,	pp.	66	-	93.	98	He	denounced	the	“assault	on	the	Italian	national	cultural	heritage”,	assimilating	Italy	to	a	joint-stock	company	under	a	takeover	bid	in	his	book:	Italia	Spa:	l’assalto	al	patrimonio	culturale,	rist.	Torino:	Einaudi	2007.	99	Salvatore	Settis,	Italia	SpA:	L'assalto	del	patrimonio	culturale,	rist.	Torino:	Einaudi,	2007.		100	The	 legal	definition	of	uti	possidetis	 is	 ‘as	you	possess’.	According	 to	 this	principle	of	 international	 law,	 the	parties	to	a	treaty	can	retain	possession	of	what	they	have	acquired	by	force	during	a	war.	101	Neil	J.	Brodie,	Historical	and	Social	Perspectives	on	the	Regulation	of	the	International	Trade	in	Archaeological	
Objects:	The	Examples	of	Greece	and	India,	Vanderbilt	Journal	of	Transnational	Law	38	no.	4	(2005):	1051	-	1066.	
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communities	 and	 groups	 in	 response	 to	 their	 environment,	 traditional	 craftsmanship,	digitalization	etc.102	The	issues	raised	by	the	querelles	regarding	the	restitution	of	cultural	goods	have	much	to	do	with	the	present	vision	of	cultural	heritage,	providing	further	evidence	to	the	effect	that	overzealousness	is	a	bad	adviser	in	this	sector.103	It	is	naïve	to	believe	that	legal	dichotomies	such	as	hard	law	versus	soft	law;	public	law	versus	private	law;	or	global	law	versus	national	law	can	explain	all	the	intricacies	in	a	tidy	scenario.	The	multi-faceted	dimension	of	cultural	heritage	 is	such	that	 it	eludes	sharp	distinctions	and	clear	demarcations.	 In	 fact,	beyond	the	legal	 standards	 produced	 either	 by	 the	 formal	 sources	 of	 law	 or	 by	way	 of	 self-regulation,	there	are	further	interests	and	claims	of	a	various	nature.	They	may	be	categorised	as	follows:	a)	those	rooted	in	moral	questions	(equity	and	justice),	for	example	related	to	our	willingness	to	challenge	purchasers’	unfairness	and	undeserved	titles	(reflected	for	instance	in	the	events	related	 to	 the	 restitution	 of	 property	 to	 Holocaust	 victims);	 b)	 other	 claims	 reflecting	 our	sociability,	 i.e.	 our	 need	 to	 live	 in	 a	 community	 of	 people,	 which	 are	 closely	 related	 to	 the	communicative	 function	 of	 cultural	 heritage;	 and	 c)	 other	 claims	 based	 on	 overt	 economic	interests.	The	law	alone	cannot	cope	with	all	these	interests	and	claims.		
10. Back	to	Diplomatic	Actions		Notwithstanding	all	the	international	and	supranational	legal	norms,	the	press	does	not	fail	to	inform	 us,	 on	 a	 daily	 basis,	 about	 sometimes	 shocking	 events	 related	 to	 cultural	 sites	 or	
                                                             102	 Roger	W.	Mastalir,	A	 Proposal	 for	 Protecting	 the	 “Cultural”	 and	 the	 “Property”	 Aspects	 of	 Cultural	 Property	
Under	International	Law,	Fordham	International	Law	Journal	16	(1992-1993):	1033	-	1091;	Siegfried	Wiessner,	
The	 Cultural	 Rights	 of	 Indigenous	 Peoples:	 Achievements	 and	 Continuing	 Challenges,	 European	 Journal	 of	
International	 Law	 22	 no.	 1	 (2011):	 121-140;	 Mauro	 Bussani,	 The	 (Legal)	 Culture	 of	 Cultural	 Property,	 in	 La	
Convención	 de	 la	 UNESCO	 de	 1970.	 Sus	 nuevos	 desafíos/The	 1970	 UNESCO	 Convention.	 New	 Challenges/La	
convention	de	 l’UNESCO	de	1970.	Les	nouveaux	défis	 edited	by	 Jorge	A.	Sánchez	Cordero,	Universidad	Nacional	Autónoma	de	México:	Ciudad	de	México,	2013pp.	401-	410.		103	 Jeanneret	 v.	 Vichey,	 541	 F.	 Supp.	 80	 (S.D.N.Y.	 1982),	 rev’d	 and	 remanded,	 693	 F.2d	 259	 (2d	 Cir.	 1982).	Comments	by	S.	Janevicius,	E.	Velioglu	Yildizci,	M.-A.	Renold,	Case	Matisse	Painting	–	Jeanneret	v.	Vichey,	Platform	
ArThemis	 2013	 http://unige.ch/art-adr,	 Art-Law	 Centre,	 University	 of	 Geneva	 [accessed	 on	 25.4.2017].	 “A	painting	by	Henri	Matisse	was	unlawfully	exported	from	Italy	to	New	York	because	its	owner,	Anna	Vichey,	never	acquired	the	mandatory	export	 license	in	1970.	The	painting	was	then	sold	to	a	Swiss	art	dealer	named	Marie	Jeanneret	and	delivered	 to	Geneva,	Switzerland.	After	discovering	 the	cloud	on	 the	 title	of	 the	painting,	Mme.	Jeanneret	was	unable	 to	 sell	 the	painting.	Mme.	 Jeanneret	 sued	 the	Vicheys	 for	breach	of	 implied	and	express	warranties,	 fraudulent	misrepresentation,	 and	 breach	 of	 contract.	 Before	 any	 final	 decision	was	made,	Mme.	Jeanneret	voluntarily	withdrew	her	action	after	she	supposedly	received	an	Italian	judgment	that	allowed	her	to	legally	sell	the	painting”.	It	is	unclear	what	Italy	did	to	allow	Mme.	Jeanneret	to	legally	sell	the	painting.	
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objects	of	art.	The	issue	is	now	also	well-documented	by	an	abundant	literature.104	Disputes	over	cultural	property	fascinate	anyone	involved	in	comparative	law,	because	it	is	through	the	analysis	of	 litigation	concerning	the	return	of	cultural	objects	–	 the	solutions	of	which	quite	often	depend	on	conflicts	of	law	rules	–	that	we	can	compare	the	various	legal	regimes	which	intervene	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 cultural	 heritage,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 international	 dimension	 in	which	these	aspects	are	inscribed.105	Usually	these	disputes	are	settled	by	alternative	dispute	mechanisms	 before	 reaching	 the	 courts:	 mediation,	 diplomatic	 missions,	 joint	 statements,	bilateral	agreements,	tripartite	cooperation	within	the	UNESCO	supervision,	etc.106		Alternative	dispute	mechanisms	often	produce	solutions	which	satisfactory	for	all	the	parties	 involved.	We	can	 recall,	 for	example,	Canova’s	 journey	 to	Paris	 to	 recover	artworks	that	 the	 French	 army	 had	 taken	 beyond	 the	 Alps.	 He	 was	 one	 of	 the	 favourite	 among	Napoleon’s	artists	and	this	fact,	together	with	the	publication	of	the	Quatremère	de	Quincy’s	pamphlet	on	 the	république	des	arts	 et	des	 sciences,	 based	on	 the	principle	 that	diviser	 c’est	
détruire,107	 helped	 him	 recover	 some	 papal	 State	 masterpieces,	 such	 as	 the	 Laocoon,	 the	Apollon	of	Belvedere,	the	Transfiguration	by	Raphael,	and	the	Deposition	of	Caravaggio	plus	several	manuscripts.	Canova’s	journey	to	London	and,	more	recently,	the	return	of	the	Axum	Obelisk	 to	 Ethiopia,	 or	 of	 the	 Venus	 of	 Cyrene	 to	 Libya108	 may	 also	 be	 cited.	 However,	diplomatic	actions	and	settlement	agreements	do	not	affect	legal	rules	and	legal	definitions	on	what	 constitutes	 “national	 treasures”	 or	 “cultural	 property”,	 which	 remain	 heterogeneous	notions.	The	legal	domain,	in	fact,	contributes	only	in	part	to	the	understanding	of	the	concept	of	 cultural	 property.	 Most	 frequently	 it	 covers	 only	 one	 part	 of	 the	 cultural	 heritage,	 the	
                                                             104	For	trends	in	international	litigation	on	this	matter,	see	the	essays	by	Jayme,	Palmer,	Symeonides,	Brodie,	and	Siehr	collected	in	the	Vanderbilt	Journal	of	Transnational	Law	issue	4/2005.	105	For	a	comprehensive	treatment:		Chechi,	The	Settlement	of	International	Cultural	Heritage	Disputes,	cit	note	5.		106	 	 Marc-André	 Renold,	 Alessandro	 Chechi,	 Anne	 Laure	 Bandle,	 Resolving	 Disputes	 in	 Cultural	 Property/	 La	résolution	des	litiges	en	matière	de	biens	culturels.		Zürich:		Schulthess	Verlag,	2012;	Alper	Tașdelen,	The	Return	
of	Cultural	Artefact:	Hard	and	Soft	Law	Approaches,	Switzerland:	Springer	International	Publishing,	2016.	107	Removing	it	from	the	place	in	which	it	had	been	created	means	to	destroy.	108	 Tullio	 Scovazzi,	 Diviser	 c’est	 détruire:	 Ethical	 Principles	 and	 Legal	 Rules	 in	 the	 field	 of	 Return	 of	 Cultural	
property,	Rivista	di	diritto	internazionale	94	(2011):	341	-	395.	
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immensely	 diverse	 mass	 of	 “documents”109	 of	 all	 types	 upon	 which	 our	 societies	 confer	 a	particular	artistic,	historical,	or	ethnological	interest.110		Thus,	 a	 question	 arises:	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 what	 criteria	 do	 States	 assign	 the	 kind	 of	“spiritual	 supplement”111	 to	 the	 strict	 materiality	 of	 an	 object?	 Are	 they	 symbolic	 of	 the	capacity	of	 the	 society	under	 consideration	 to	understand	and	represent	 its	present	and	 its	past,	as	well	as	those	of	others?	The	majority	of	these	objects	are	potential	carriers	of	multiple	meanings	 and	 information	 about	 the	 history	 and	 beauty	 of	 mankind.	 Are	 all	 of	 these	“documents”	 cultural	 property?	 What	 fate	 do	 States	 reserve	 for	 them?	 Whenever	 we	encounter	them	–	even	when	the	definition	varies	and	comprises	 intangible	objects	–	 it	 is	a	question	of	 their	 “conservation”,112	with	 the	 goals	 of	 conservation	 being:	 1)	 to	 ensure	 their	durability;	2)	to	respect	their	integrity;	and	3)	to	offer	wide	accessibility.	Yet,	it	is	a	question	of	balancing	 the	 interests	 and	 limits	 imposed	 by	 conservation	with	 the	 interests	 on	 the	 social	usefulness	of	the	cultural	heritage,	transmitted	by	the	revelation	of	its	aesthetic,	historical	(or	other)	message.	
	
11. “Another	Way	of	Owning”			In	our	opinion,	 the	relationship	between	cultural	heritage	and	national	 treasures	within	the	internal	market	(and	also	outside)	cannot	be	regarded	as	being	subject	only	to	a	legal	regime	based	on	classic	individual,	absolute,	and	exclusive	ownership	in	the	Blackstonian	sense.113	On	the	contrary,	their	“common”	dimension	gives	even	tangible	objects	some	inherent	attributes	of	 an	 immaterial,	 intangible	 character,	which	 supports	 including	 them	under	 the	 protective	umbrella	 of	 the	 commons,	 as	 a	 tertium	 genus	 in	 between	 public	 and	 private	 ownership.114	
                                                             109	 	 Jacques	Le	Goff	 (ed.),	Patrimoine	et	passions	 identitaires,	Actes	des	Entretiens	du	Patrimoine,	Paris:	Fayard,	1998.	110	Marie	Cl.	Berducou,	Introduction	a	la	conservation	archéologique	(1990),	transl.	Introduction	to	Archeological	
Conservation,	 in	Historical	 and	 Philosophical	 Issues	 in	 the	 Conservation	 of	 Cultural	 History	 edited	 by	 Nicholas	Stanley	Price,	et	al.,	cit.	note	90,		pp.	247	-	259.	111	Berducou,	cit.	previous	note,	at	247.	112	Ibid.,	250.	113	Antonio	Gambaro,	Community,	State,	Individuals	and	the	Ownership	of	Cultural	Objects,	in	La	Convención	de	la	
UNESCO	de	1970.	Sus	nuevos	desafíos/The	1970	UNESCO	Convention.	New	Challenges	edited	by	Jorge	A.	Sánchez	Cordero,	cit.	note	111,	pp.		135-149.	114	 Francesco	 Francioni,	Public	 and	 Private	 in	 the	 International	 Protection	 of	 Global	 Cultural	 Goods,	European	
Journal	of	International	Law,	23	no.	3	(2012):	 	719	–	730,	at	722.	For	more	on	cultural	property	as	a	common	good,	 following	 the	 theories	 by	 Hardin	 1968	 and	 Ostrom	 1990,	 see:	 Pablo	 A.	 Gonzales,	 From	 a	 Given	 to	 a	
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Another	way	of	owning,	as	Paolo	Grossi	wrote	in	his	seminal	work115,	may	be	the	best	way	to	properly	 represent	 this	 new	 form	 of	 owning	 by	 the	 community.	 It	 is	 based	 on	 the	 same	paradigm	that	challenged	the	great	 transformation	during	the	origins	of	 the	modern	market	economy,	 as	Karl	 Polanyi	 highlights	with	 exemplary	 passion	 in	his	 book.116	 By	 calling	 it	 an	“instance	 of	 sociality”,	 we	 refer	 to	 the	 powerful	 nucleus	 of	 civic	 (i.e.	 related	 to	 citizens)	expectations,	 that	 starts	moving	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 appropriation	 –	 by	 private	individuals	or	by	public	entities	-	collides	in	practice	with	the	wider	use	of	assets	which	were	previously	 conceived	 of	 as	 “part	 of	 the	 community”,	 which	 nowadays	 involves	 many	disciplines	 beyond	 just	 the	 law,	 from	 urban	 planning	 to	 sociology	 and	 anthropology	(humanities	in	general).	The	notion	of	a	“common	good”	has	been	closely	bound	up	with	the	idea	of	citizenship,	as	a	material	consequence	of	collective	actions	of	citizens	participating	in	their	own	self-government;	at	the	same	time	“commons”	identifies	the	possibility	that	politics	can	 be	 about	 more	 than	 building	 an	 institutional	 framework	 for	 the	 narrow	 pursuit	 of	individual	self-interest	in	the	essentially	private	domain	of	liberalized	markets.117	Citizens	can	claim	 a	 right	 to	 enjoy	 these	 common	 goods,	 as	 Gino	 Gorla	 pointed	 out	 in	 his	 meaningful	essay.118	With	respect	to	cultural	heritage,	“another	way	of	owning”	becomes	essential.	119	We	must	 acknowledge	 at	 the	 outset	 that	 contemporary	 legal	 concepts	 and	 the	 legal	jargon	 which	 expresses	 them	 –	 especially	 those	 provided	 by	 the	 continental	 Civil	 codes,	eventually	exported	to	many	non-Western	countries	through	imposition	(read:	colonization),	
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Construct:	Heritage	as	a	Commons,	Cultural	Studies	28	no.	3	(2013):	359-390;	and		Lyndel	V.	Prott,	International	
Standards	for	Cultural	Heritage,	in	World	Culture	Report,	edited	by	UNESCO,	Paris:	UNESCO	publ.,	1998,	pp.	222-236.	See	also	André.	Micoud,	Le	Bien	Commun	des	patrimoines,	Patrimoine	culturel,	patrimoine	naturel,	Actes	du	colloque	de	l'École	Nationale	du	patrimoine,	12	et	13	décembre	1994,	Paris:	La	Documentation	française,	1995,	pp.	 25-38.	 Cf	 Andrzej	Jakubowski	 (ed.),	Cultural	 Rights	 as	 Collective	 Rights:	 An	 International	 Law	 Perspective,	Brill-Nijhoff:	Leiden	–	Boston	2016.	115	Paolo	Grossi,	Un	altro	modo	di	possedere.	L'emersione	di	forme	alternative	di	proprietà	alla	coscienza	giuridica	
postunitaria,	Milano,	 1977;	 Ibidem,	 "Un	 altro	modo	 di	 possedere"	 rivisitato,	 Agricoltura,	 istituzioni,	 mercati,	 1	(2007):	11-20.	116	Karl	Polanyi,	The	Great	Transformation,	New	York,	Toronto:	Farrar	&	Rinehart,	1944;	Chris	Hann,	Keith	Hart	(eds.),	Market	and	Society:	the	Great	Transformation	Today,	Cambridge,	UK:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2009.	117	 Joseph	 L.	Sax,	Property	 Rights	and	 the	Economy	 of	 Nature:	 Understanding	 Lucas	 v.	 South	 Carolina	 Coastal	
Council,	Stan.	L.	Rev.	45	no.	5	(1992-93):	1433	-	1456;	Id.,	cit.	supra	notes	93	and	96;	see	also	Carol	Rose,	Joseph	
Sax	and	the	Idea	of	the	Public	Trust,	Issues	in	Legal	Scholarship	(2003):	Article	8,	https://doi.org/10.2202/1539-8323.1050.	118	Gino	Gorla,	 Il	Museo	Guarnacci	di	Volterra,	 la	Fabbrica	di	porcellane	Ginori	e	 i	palazzi	di	Firenze:	(dall'aurea	
giurisprudenza	della	Rota	fiorentina	al	codice	civile	del	1942),	Foro	it.,	1972,	V,	31.		119	Joseph	L.	Sax,	Is	Anyone	Minding	Stonehenge?	The	Origins	of	Cultural	Property	Protection	in	England,	Cal.	L.	Rev.	78	(1990):	1543	–	1567;	Ibid.,	Imaginatively	Public:	The	English	Experience	of	Art	as	Heritage	Property,	Vanderbilt	
Journal	of	Transnational	Law	38	no.	4	(2005):	1097	-	1140.	
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by	chance	(read:	migration),	or	by	prestige	(read:	being	part	of	a	wealthy	club	of	nations,	such	as	in	the	case	of	WTO,	or	EU)	–	do	not	help	in	understanding	the	expression	“another	way	of	
owning”.120	The	expression	carries	with	 it	 a	 sense	of	 community	and	common	 identity.	And	precisely	at	this	point	comparative	law	can	be	helpful	in	understanding	the	implicit	dimension	of	 legal	 rules	 that	benefit	 a	 given	community,	 their	meanings	and	 limits,	 and	accepting	 that	elsewhere	there	is	another	community	of	people	characterized	by	other	ways	of	thinking,	and	understanding	 that	 another	 way	 of	 owning	 is	 possible	 when	 paradigms	 change	 because	
cryptotypes121	 are	 revealed.	 The	 cryptotype,	 a	 term	 imported	 from	 linguistics	 into	 law	 by	Rodolfo	 Sacco,	 is	 the	 underlying	 pattern	 to	 be	 revealed,	 or	made	 visible	 by	 logical	 or	 non-logical	inferences	from	an	explicit	rule122.	Individuals	often	operate	on	the	basis	of	a	“sense	of	what	 would	 be	 morally	 wrong	 or	 right,	 or	 even	 illegal	 or	 legal”,	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	knowledge	of	the	relevant	rules	or	laws	and	without	being	able	to	conceptualize	what	would	be	wrong	about	the	relevant	course	of	action.	They	can	have	“a	feeling	of	entering	forbidden	territory	 without	 having	 a	 conception	 of	 the	 boundaries	 of	 that	 territory”.123	 Unveiling	cryptotypes	 can	 foster	 better	 understanding	 of	 social	 and	 normative	 dynamics	 in	 cultural	heritage	law.	
	
                                                             120	Ugo	Mattei,	Edoardo	Reviglio,	Stefano	Rodotà	 (eds.),	 Invertire	 la	 rotta.	 Idee	per	una	riforma	della	proprietà	
pubblica,	Bologna:	Il	Mulino,	2007.	Cf	Carla	Barbati,	Marco	Cammelli,	Girolamo	Sciullo	(eds.),	Diritto	e	gestione	dei	
beni	culturali,	Bologna:	Il	Mulino,	2011.	121	A	cryptotype	amounts	to	a	legal	formant	without	an	explicit	linguistic	formulation,	see	Rodolfo	Sacco,	Legal	
Formants:	A	Dynamic	Approach	to	Comparative	Law	(Installment	I	of	II),	American	Journal	of	Comparative	Law		39	no.	1	(1991):	1	–	34.	The	discovery	of	a	cryptotype	is	facilitated	when,	as	happens,	a	 legal	rule,	a	concept,	or	a	principle	implicit	 in	one	legal	system	is	explicit	 in	another	legal	system.	Normally,	 jurists	belonging	to	a	given	system	find	greater	difficulty	in	freeing	themselves	from	the	cryptotypes	of	their	system	than	in	abandoning	the	rules	of	which	they	are	fully	aware.	For	some	scholars,	the	subjection	to	cryptotypes	constitutes	the	mentality	of	the	jurist	of	a	given	country	at	a	given	time,	and	such	differences	in	mentality	are	the	greatest	obstacle	to	mutual	understanding	between	legal	actors	of	different	legal	systems.	Cf	Pierre	Legrand,	Fragments	on	Law-as-Culture,	Deventer:	W.E.J.	Tjeenk	Willink,	1999.	Although	a	cryptotype	can	be	intended	as	a	part	of	the	mentality,	it	does	not	coincide	with	it.	Individuals	often	follow	rules	which	they	are	not	aware	of,	or	which	they	would	not	be	able	to	articulate	or	explain.	For	instance,	few	would	be	able	to	formulate	the	language	rule	we	follow	when	we	say	
three	dark	suits	and	not	three	suits	dark	(Sacco	1991).	See	Barbara	Pasa,	Lucia	Morra,	Implicit	Legal	Norms,	 in	
Handbook	 of	 Communication	 in	 the	 Legal	 Sphere	 edited	by	 Jacqueline	Visconti,	Berlin	/	New	York:	Mouton	De	Gruyter,	2017.	122	 The	 tacit	 normative	 dimension	 is	 connected	 to	 the	 legal	 text	 through	 the	 halo	 of	 implicit	 meaning	 that	intersects	the	“living	law”	where	the	legal	text	suggests,	implies,	or	alludes.	“The	living	law”	Ehrlich	wrote,	is	“the	law	which	dominates	life	itself	even	though	it	has	not	been	posited	in	legal	propositions	(…)”	:	cf	Eugen	Ehrlich	
Fundamental	Principles	of	the	Sociology	of	Law,	Harvard:	Transaction	Publishers	(1962),	at	493.	123	 Michael	 Schmitz,	 Social	 Rules	 and	 the	 Social	 Background,	 in	 The	 Background	 of	 Social	 Reality:	 Selected	
Contributions	from	the	Inaugural	Meeting	of	ENSO	edited	by	Michael	Schmitz	et	al.,	Dordrecht:	Springer,	2013,	pp.	107-125.	
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12. Conclusions		The	relationship	between	cultural	heritage	and	national	treasures	in	Europe	requires	a	close	reflection	 on	 the	 intricate	 relationship	 between	 national	 and	 international	 rules	 and	standards,	 between	 formal	 and	 informal	 sources	 of	 law.	 The	 complexity	 arising	 from	 the	interaction	of	many	normative	 layers	 is	well	reflected	 in	the	 legal	 language,	 in	particular	on	“cultural”	 as	 an	 overdone	 adjectivisation	 used	 by	 the	 law,	 which	 may	 be	 summarised	 as	follows:	“cultural	property”	-	was	first	a	notion	with	multiple	meanings,	irrespective	of	origin	or	 ownership,	 adopted	 by	 the	 Hague	 Convention	 of	 1954	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 cultural	property	in	the	event	of	armed	conflict	and	its	two	(1954	and	1999)	Protocols.	The	notion	of		“cultural	heritage”	of	each	State	-	was	then	used	in	Article	4	of	the	1970	UNESCO	Convention	on	 the	 means	 of	 prohibiting	 and	 preventing	 the	 illicit	 import,	 export	 and	 a	 transfer	 of	ownership	of	cultural	property124,	and	in	the	1995	UNIDROIT	Convention	on	stolen	or	illegally	exported	 cultural	 objects125,	 which	 introduced	 another	 notion,	 namely:	 “cultural	 object”	 –	indeed	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 protecting	 cultural	 heritage,	 each	 State	 can	 claim	 the	 restitution	(Article	1	(a))/return	(Article	1	(b))	of	stolen/illicitly	removed	cultural	objects:	those	which,	on	 religious	 or	 secular	 grounds,	 are	 of	 importance	 for	 archaeology,	 prehistory,	 history,	literature,	art	or	science	and	belong	to	one	of	the	categories	 listed	 in	 the	Annex	to	the	1995	UNIDROIT	Convention.126		“Cultural	 object”	 is	 now	 a	 quite	 widespread	 notion,	 articulated	 with	 respect	 to	 the	quality	of	the	object	according	to	the	context,	time	and	space	in	which	it	is	inserted,	as	well	as	
                                                             124	Cit	supra	note	4.	125	Cit	supra	note	7.	See	Frigo,	The	Impact	of	the	UNIDROIT	Convention,	cit.	supra	note	75.	126	 Annex:	 (a)	 Rare	 collections	 and	 specimens	 of	 fauna,	 flora,	 minerals	 and	 anatomy,	 and	 objects	 of	palaeontological	 interest;	 (b)	property	 relating	 to	history,	 including	 the	history	of	 science	and	 technology	and	military	and	social	history,	to	the	life	of	national	leaders,	thinkers,	scientists	and	artists	and	to	events	of	national	importance;	(c)	products	of	archaeological	excavations	(including	regular	and	clandestine)	or	of	archaeological	discoveries;	 (d)	 elements	 of	 artistic	 or	 historical	 monuments	 or	 archaeological	 sites	 which	 have	 been	dismembered;	(e)	antiquities	more	than	one	hundred	years	old,	such	as	inscriptions,	coins	and	engraved	seals;	(f)	objects	of	ethnological	interest;	(g)	property	of	artistic	interest,	such	as:	(i)	pictures,	paintings	and	drawings	produced	entirely	by	hand	on	any	support	and	in	any	material	(excluding	industrial	designs	and	manufactured	articles	 decorated	 by	 hand);	 (ii)	 original	 works	 of	 statuary	 art	 and	 sculpture	 in	 any	 material;	 	(iii)	 original	engravings,	 prints	 and	 lithographs;	 (iv)	 original	 artistic	 assemblages	 and	montages	 in	 any	material;	 (h)	 rare	manuscripts	 and	 incunabula,	 old	 books,	 documents	 and	 publications	 of	 special	 interest	 (historical,	 artistic,	scientific,	literary,	etc.)	singly	or	in	collections;	(i)	postage,	revenue	and	similar	stamps,	singly	or	in	collections;	(j)	archives,	including	sound,	photographic	and	cinematographic	archives;	(k)	articles	of	furniture	more	than	one	hundred	years	old	and	old	musical	instruments.	
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to	the	messages	that	it	conveys	to	different	communities,	since	the	problem	of	cultural	objects	affects	all	objects	that	express	a	meta-individual	message.127	Unfortunately,	“cultural/culture”	is	 a	 hot-button	word:	 it	 is	 both	 eclectic	 and	 polyphonic.	 The	 international	 Conventions	 and	supranational	 institutions	 perhaps	 overstate	 the	 cohesiveness	 of	 “culture”.	 Western	intellectual	traditions	have	conceptualized	the	notion.	Stemming	from	the	verb	colere	in	early	Latin	usages,	 culture	denotes	a	 state	 in	which	nature	has	been	 redefined	by	human	efforts.	The	 idea	of	 the	cultivation	of	 the	 individual	 is	then	transferred	to	societies,	creating	a	meta-individual	 dimension	 of	 societal	 progress.	 The	 Age	 of	 Enlightenment	 expressed	 this	 idea	through	the	French	term	“civilisation”,	meaning	culture	as	a	measurable	quality	according	to	universal	standards,	whereas	the	Age	of	Counter-Enlightenment,	and	particularly	J.G.	Herder,	rejected	 the	 cosmopolitan	 concept	 and	 linked	 the	 term	 “Kultur”	 to	 the	 agenda	 of	 Romantic	Nationalism,	which	exalted	diversities.128	On	one	hand	it	is	a	meta-national	culture	that	instils	a	 sense	of	unity	 for	 the	 construction	of	statehood;	while,	 on	 the	other,	 it	 is	 a	particularistic	concept	identified	with	the	uniqueness	of	a	community	within	the	nation-state,	threatened	by	trends	towards	unification.	The	roots	of	the	term	“culture”,	 just	briefly	recalled	here,	and	its	slippery	multi-valence	meaning	cast	doubts	on	the	usefulness	of	the	concept	as	a	heuristic	tool	with	 an	 explanatory	 function.	 Behaviours,	 which	 the	 law	 aspires	 to	 regulate,	 are	 also	 a	product	 of	 the	 brain,	 an	 organ	 of	 our	 body	 in	 constant	 cognitive	 adaptation	 in	 response	 to	social	 interactions,	so	 it	seems	we	should	be	seriously	rethinking	the	role	of	both	biological	and	 cultural	 elements	 in	 shaping	human	behaviour.	 	 Furthermore,	 the	polyphonic	 sound	of	the	word	“culture”	is	amplified	by	the	circular	relationship	between	law	and	culture:	culture	produces	a	set	of	values,	rules	and	institutions	that	together	create	the	way	of	acting	of	a	given	community,	 while	 legal	 rules	 and	 practices	 give	 normativity	 to	 a	 given	 culture.	 Law	 is	 a	
performative	 language:	 the	 very	 act	 of	 naming	 the	 content	 of	 culture	 also	 constructs	 its	heritage	 and	 identity	 as	 “culture”.	 This	 is	 not	 a	 natural	 fact;	 it	 pertains	 to	 the	 normative	dimension,	 has	 a	 complex	 historicity,	 and	 it	 cannot	 be	 dissociated	 from	 the	 relationship	between	disciplines,	regulations,	and	sanctions.	Thus	it	is	a	fact	that	“European	culture”	is	an	
                                                             127	 Antonio	Gambaro,	 Il	 diritto	 di	 proprietà,	 in	Trattato	 di	 diritto	 civile	 e	 commerciale,	 edited	 by	Antonio	Cicu,	Francesco	Messineo	and	Luigi	Mengoni,	Milano,	1995,	at	326.		128	 Helge	 Dedek,	When	 Law	 Became	 Cultivated:	 ‘European	 Legal	 Culture’	 between	 Kultur	 and	 Civilization,	 in	
Towards	 a	 European	 Legal	 Culture	 edited	 by	 Geneviève	Helleringer,	 Kai	Purnhagen,	 Baden-Baden,	 Oxford,	Munich:	Hart,	2014,	pp.		351-374,	at	354	ff.	
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ambiguous	 concept,	 in	 a	 state	 of	 flux	 as	 it	 is	 specific	 to	 national	 contexts	 and	 historical	variances	and	will	probably	never	become	fixed.		The	European	institutions	were	first	involved	in	the	regulation	of	the	trade	in	cultural	goods	while	laying	down	the	rules	establishing	the	common	market.	Those	rules	allowed	for	the	 possibility	 of	 national	 restrictive	 measures	 taken	 to	 protect	 “national	 treasures”	“possessing	 artistic,	 historic	 or	 archaeological	 value”.	 Those	 measures	 were	 acceptable,	provided	that	 they	did	not	constitute	a	means	of	“arbitrary	discrimination”	nor	a	“disguised	restriction”	 on	 trade	 between	 Member	 States.	 This	 norm	 is	 still	 with	 us,	 under	 Article	 36	TFUE.	Meanwhile	the	Community,	and	then	the	Union,	have	taken	several	initiatives	to	both	enable	 the	Member	States	 to	protect	 their	national	 treasures	after	 the	establishment	of	 the	single	 market.	 The	 EU	 tries	 to	 ensure	 that	 European	 cultural	 heritage	 is	 safeguarded	 and	enhanced	 (Article	3(3)	TEU),	 to	strengthen	 the	 competitiveness	of	 the	 cultural	 and	creative	sectors	and	to	facilitate	adaptation	to	industrial	changes,	but,	at	the	same	time,	the	EU	has	no	competence	over	 cultural	 legislation	and	 it	must	 contribute	 to	 the	 flowering	of	 the	Member	States’	cultures,	while	respecting	their	national	and	regional	diversity	(Article	167	TFEU).129	Does	 this	mean	something	more	 than	 that	Member	States	must	 fully	 respect	 their	different	traditions,	histories,	 and	 linguistic	diversities?	Doesn’t	 this	mean	 that	 the	EU	has	 to	protect	diversity	instead	of	bringing	a	“common	European	cultural	heritage”	to	the	fore?	The	EU	then	has	 taken	 actions	 to	 combat	 the	 illicit	 trafficking	 of	 cultural	 goods.	 Similar	 efforts	 are	 now	directed	towards	the	repression	of	the	trafficking	of	cultural	goods	imported	in	Europe	from	other	parts	 of	 the	world.	 The	 latest	 initiative	 in	 this	 respect	 is	 the	 proposed	EU	Regulation	issued	on	July	2017	on	the	import	of	cultural	goods.	The	action	of	European	institutions	in	this	area	of	 the	 law	takes	place	on	a	 terrain	 located	 in	between	the	exclusive	competence	of	 the	Member	States,	 and	 the	many	 international	 texts	and	 initiatives	 that	 establish	 international	regimes	 aimed	 at	 protecting	 cultural	 property,	 cultural	 objects	 and	 the	 cultural	 heritage,	subject	to	public	and	private	law	regimes.		Considering	this	complex	landscape,	a	few	conclusions	can	be	drawn.	The	regulation	of	the	field	can	be	improved	by	making	a	more	parsimonious	use	of	the	notion	of	culture	and	by	improving	the	terminology	that	is	used	to	frame	new	rules,	by	rendering	it	more	transparent,	
                                                             129 See	Article	 167	TFEU	which	 reads:	 “The	Union	 shall	 contribute	 to	 the	 flowering	 of	 the	cultures	 of	 the	EU	Member	States,	while	respecting	their	national	and	regional	diversity	and	at	the	same	time	bringing	the	common	cultural	heritage	to	the	fore”.		
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and	 rigorous.	 The	 adjective	 “cultural”,	which	 features	 so	prominently	 in	 the	 discourse	 over	what	is	to	be	protected,	does	not	identify	a	homogenous	category	of	objects,	that	are	all	to	be	subject	to	the	same	policy.	The	protection	and	the	fruition	of	archaeological	discoveries	poses	different	problems	from	those	involved	in	the	protection	and	the	fruition	of	contemporary	art,	ancient	paintings,	or	frescos,	etc.	Reference	to	“culture”	in	setting	new	rules	to	govern	these	matters	 is	 not	 by	 itself	 the	 game	 changing	 move.	 130	 Considering	 the	 competence	 of	 the	Member	States	over	the	identification	and	protection	of	the	national	cultural	heritage,	we	do	not	think	it	would	be	productive	to	push	for	an	even	broader,	all	compassing	legal	notion	of	European	cultural	heritage.	Nonetheless,	we	think	that	the	support	that	the	Union	can	provide	to	 the	 improvement	 of	 the	 protection	 cultural	 heritage	 at	 the	 national	 level	 remains	important.	 It	 can	be	 further	strengthened	by	showing	how	it	does	contribute	to	 the	making	and	 the	 development	 of	 a	 European	 cultural	 landscape.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 current	protection	afforded	by	European	regulations	and	directives	to	national	treasures	shows	some	limitations.	The	circumstance	that	the	Union	still	relies	the	Annex	to	Regulation	116/2009	for	certain	 purposes	 is	 an	 example	 of	 these	 limitations.	 Unfortunately,	 this	 approach	 has	 also	influenced	the	national	legislation	of	a	few	Member	States,	on	the	occasion	of	their	accession	to	 the	 Union.	 Despite	 these	 shortcomings,	 the	 emergence	 of	 global	 norms	 and	 standards	accepted	at	the	international	and	at	the	national	level	is	a	fact.	The	Union,	through	its	action,	contributed,	and	will	continue	to	contribute	in	the	future	to	this	movement,	thus	highlighting	the	gradual	acceptance	of	the	idea	of	a	common	heritage	of	mankind.	131			
                                                             *	 This	 Chapter	 is	 the	 product	 of	 collaborative	 research.	 It	 has	 been	 jointly	 discussed	 and	 written,	 and	 both	authors	contributed	to	all	sections.	
                                                             130	 Geneviève	Helleringer,	 Kai	Purnhagen	 (eds),	 Towards	 a	 European	 Legal	 Culture,	 Baden-Baden,	 Oxford,	Munich:	Hart,	2014.	131	 This	 pluralistic	 dimension	 of	 cultural	 property	 is	 already	 reflected	 in	 the	 language	 of	 the	 1954	 Hague	Convention	 (cit	 supra	 note	 2),	 according	 to	 which	 “damage	 to	 cultural	 property	 belonging	 to	 any	 people	whatsoever	means	damage	to	the	cultural	heritage	of	all	mankind,	since	each	people	makes	its	contribution	to	the	culture	of	the	world”	(see	the	Preamble).	
